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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Labor Union
Exemption-Agreement Between Union and
"Stranger" Building Contractor Obligating
Contractor to Subcontract Only with Parties to
Union's Collective Bargaining Agreements Is Not
Exempt from the Sherman Act
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, a building contractor, sought a judgment declaring its
restrictive subcontracting agreement' with defendant union viola-
tive of the Sherman Act2 and, therefore, invalid. Defendant, a bar-
gaining agent for plumbers and mechanical tradesmen, neither had
nor sought a collective bargaining relationship with plaintiff, who
let subcontracts for all of its plumbing and mechanical work on the
basis of competitive bids.3 The litigants' agreement obligated plain-
tiff to deal only with plumbing and mechanical contracting firms
that were parties to defendant's collective bargaining contracts. 4
Plaintiff, calling attention to the "most favored nation" clause5 of
defendant's then current multiemployer bargaining contract, al-
leged that the agreement served no legitimate union purpose and
1. The contract signed by the litigants will be referred to as the "agreement" to avoid
confusion with the defendant's multiemployer or other collective bargaining contracts. The
entire text of the agreement is found in the opinion of the Supreme Court. Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 95 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1975).
2. Plaintiff alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Act. Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
§§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). Plaintiff originally brought suit in a Texas court alleging
violations of that state's antitrust and right to work laws and seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. Upon defendant's removal of the case to federal court, plaintiff amended its
complaint additionally to claim federal antitrust violations and seek a federal injunction.
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (order).
3. Defendant represents plumbers and mechanical tradesmen in the Dallas, Texas area.
Plaintiff, also located in Dallas, is a general contractor who employed no plumbers or mechan-
ical tradesmen at the time the agreement was signed. In the past, plaintiff had subcontracted
with both nonunion and union plumbing and mechanical contracting firms.
4. Note I supra. Plaintiff signed the agreement after initially refusing to do'so. Follow-
ing plaintiff's refusal, defendant peacefully picketed one of plaintiff's construction sites,
whereupon some of plaintiff's employees discontinued work. Under protest, plaintiff then
signed the agreement. Subsequently, defendant sought to impose similar agreements on other
general contractors, some of whom signed while others resisted.
5. Defendant's multiemployer collective bargaining contract was with the Mechanical
Contractor's Association of Dallas, a group of about 75 firms. The "most favored nation"
clause in this contract obligated the union, upon the granting of a more favorable contract
to any other employer, to extend the same terms to the members of the association.
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restrained competition. Claiming that the agreement was a lawful
means of organizing area subcontractors, defendant disavowed any
intent to shelter the parties to its multiemployer collective bargain-
ing contract from competition and counterclaimed for a judgment
declaring the agreement both statutorily and nonstatutorily exempt
from federal antitrust law. Finding the agreement in accord with the
construction industry proviso of section 8(e) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19596 (LMRDA), the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
granted the relief requested by defendant.7 On different grounds,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order.8 On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, reversed in part and remanded? An
agreement between a union and a contractor whose employees the
union does not seek to organize, which obligates the contractor to
subcontract all work of a prescribed nature on any jobsite to firms
that are parties to the union's collective bargaining agreements, is
not exempt from the Sherman Act. Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
6. Section 8(e) provides in part:
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting
or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing
business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore
or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void:
Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting
or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting,
or repair of a building, structure, or other work: ....
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LMRDA]. Defendant's restrictive subcontracting agreement with
plaintiff was drawn carefully to comport with the language of § 8(e). See note 1 supra.
7. The district court held, as a matter of law, that the agreement was consonant with
the construction industry proviso of § 8(e) of the LMRDA and that therefore, being author-
ized by Congress, the agreement did not violate the Sherman Act. In its order the court did
not address the question of nonstatutory antitrust immunity. It did find, however, that under
the facts presented the state antitrust laws allegedly violated by the defendant were
preempted by federal legislation. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M.
3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (order).
8. Essentially, the Fifth Circuit found that no conspiracy violative of the Sherman Act
was proved but that a violation of federal labor legislation arguably existed, over which the
National Labor Relations Board would have exclusive original jurisdiction. The district court
below consequently was held not to have had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action. Finally,
concluding that the state antitrust law in issue was preempted by federal labor legislation,
the court affirmed the dismissal. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1973).
9. The Court affirmed the finding of the lower courts that state antitrust law was
preempted. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 635-37 (1975).
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I-. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The extent to which labor unions are exempt from federal anti-
trust law is an issue that has long confronted the Supreme Court
and about which the Court and Congress apparently have often
disagreed. Stated differently, the question is whether certain union
activities are to be dealt with in terms of the national labor policy
favoring collective bargaining or the national economic policy favor-
ing free competition.
Subsequent to enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act" in
1890, the Supreme Court harbored no doubt that the Act applied
to union activities. Prompted by dissatisfaction with this judicial
view, Congress passed the Clayton Act 3 in 1914 defining labor un-
ions and the carrying out of their "legitimate objectives" in a man-
ner calculated to exempt them from antitrust sanctions. 4 In the
1921 case of Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,5 however, the
Court severely limited the exemptive effect of the Clayton Act by
holding that a variety of secondary organizational tactics, including
strikes and boycotts, were not legitimate union activities and re-
10. See Cox, Labor and Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
252 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the
Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 659 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Meltzer]; Winter,
Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union
Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Winter].
11. Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Anti-Trust Act), ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)).
12. There is conflicting evidence regarding the intent of Congress to subject unions to
the Sherman Act. See S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATEs 342, 355 n.16 (4th ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as COHEN]. An amendment to remove unions from the coverage of the Act
was defeated in Congress during the legislative debates. Cox, supra note 10, at 252, 256. It is
noteworthy that of the first six cases initiated by the Justice Department under the Sherman
Act, four were against labor unions. A. NEALE, THE ANTrmUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 16 n.1 (2d
ed. 1974). The Supreme Court first explicitly held unions subject to the Act in Loewe v. Law-
lor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908), in which the United Hatters Union was
held liable for boycotting an unorganized hat manufacturer and causing approximately
$80,000 in lost sales. The case came before the Court again in 1915, when it was held that
union members and officers were jointly liable for treble damages and attorney's fees awarded
to the manufacturer. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
13. Antitrust Act, 1914 (Clayton Act), ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Clayton Act].
14. Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act generally provide that human labor is not a
commodity, that the antitrust laws should not be interpreted to restrain the existence of
unions or the carrying out of their legitimate activites, and that injunctions should not be
issued by the federal courts in certain types of labor disputes. Id. §§ 6, 20 (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970)). As early as 1906, the American Federation of Labor had
petitioned Congress for such legislation. COHEN, supra note 12, at 343.
15. 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (machinists organizations combined to institute a multifaceted
secondary boycott against a printing press manufacturer).
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mained vulnerable to the Sherman Act.'6 In the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 17 and the National Labor Relations Act'" (NLRA), passed in
1932 and 1935 respectively, Congress renewed its endeavor to pro-
tect union efforts to organize labor and improve working conditions.
The injunctive power of the federal courts was restricted in labor
cases;'9 the jurisdiction of the courts in the enforcement of labor
legislation was narrowed through the creation of the National Labor
Relations Board;"0 and a variety of organizational tactics were af-
forded protection and encouragement. 21 A major fault of the new
legislation, however, was that it failed to coordinate the intended
expansion of union antitrust immunity with either the Clayton Act
or a contraction of the potential union liability emanating from the
Sherman Act.2  In the 1939 case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,2 3 the
Court, while avoiding the statutory integration problem, acknowl-
edged that strikes inevitably restrain the power of employers to
compete; it was held, nonetheless, that strikes were not necessarily
violative of the Sherman Act.2 1 Without finding a statutory exemp-
tion, the Court exempted from antitrust liability what, in its view,
were legitimate labor activities. 5 The statutory integration problem
was confronted and seemingly resolved in 1941 when the Court, in
United States v. Hutcheson," interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia
16. In so holding, it was apparent that the Court was prepared to apply its own notions
of what was or was not a legitimate union activity in interpreting the Clayton Act. Thus, the
prerogative of the Court in the area of labor policy continued. See Meltzer, supra note 10, at
663-65.
17. Act of March 23, 1932 (Norris-LaGuardia Act), ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as Norris-LaGuardia Act].
18. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
19. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1.
20. NLRA § 3.
21. Id. §§ 7-9.
22. See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 665-66; Winter, supra note 10, at 38. Neither the
Norris-LaGuardia Act nor the NLRA even mentioned the Sherman Act.
23. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
24. Apex, the first Supreme Court case of the New Deal era involving union liability
under the Sherman Act, signalled a definite change in the Court's attitude toward such
liability, a judicial deference to the continuing legislative efforts to exempt unions from the
Sherman Act, and a shift from the Court to Congress in the initiative regarding national
economic policy as it affected labor. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965)
(Goldberg, Harlan & Stewart, J.J., dissenting); COHEN, supra note 12, at 370.
25. The Court held that workers who, seeking to organize employees, forcibly and
illegally seized control over a hosiery manufacturing plant, staged a sit-down strike, and
prevented the shipment of finished goods to markets did not ipso facto violate antitrust law.
The Court, failing to find that the union had an intent to affect competition or market prices
or that its actions were actually the cause of such results, found no union liability under the
Sherman Act. 310 U.S. at 500-03.
26. 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (union struck and instituted a secondary boycott against em-
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and Clayton Acts interdependently.27 In so doing, the Court held
that a labor union acting in its own interest and not in concert with
nonlabor entities was exempted legislatively from antitrust liability
regardless of any resulting restraint on competition;2 8 the congres-
sional intent underlying the Clayton Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act,
and NLRA seemingly had been effectuated. 2 Four years later in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW3 ° the Court addressed the issue,
undecided in Hutcheson, of whether a union acting anticompeti-
tively and in concert with nonlabor parties was shielded by the
statutory antitrust exemption. Admitting that the union involved
had bargained with employers in the interest of its members, the
Court nevertheless found that the labor agreements in question were
part of a larger plan enabling manufacturers and contractors to
create a sheltered geographic market." Characterizing the union
activity as "aiding and abetting" violations of the Sherman Act, the
Court held that the antitrust exemption recognized in Hutcheson
was inapplicable and found the union liable.2 The Court stated,
however, that if the union had acted alone it would have been im-
mune from liability.3
Federal labor policy took a new turn with the enactment of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 194711 (LMRA), which reversed
the trend of congressional sentiment favoring the secondary organi-
zational activity of unions. 5 In accordance with Congress' intent to
limit the vastly increased power of unions,36 certain types of second-
ployer as a result of jurisdictional dispute with another union).
27. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter first stated that the existence of a
Sherman Act violation must be determined by reading the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts harmoniously. Id. at 229. He asserted that Congress had passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to clarify the labor policies previously set forth in the Clayton Act but not
fully carried out by the courts. Id. at 234. He construed the Norris-LaGuardia Act as having
"... reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized
trade union activities as redefined by the later Act." Id. at 236. It has been remarked that
this statutory construction underlying the holding in Hutcheson is not unqualifiedly accepta-
ble. See Cox, supra note 10, at 265.
28. 312 U.S. at 232.
29. The Court's holding in Hutcheson may be seen as marking the beginning of the era,
foretold by Apex, of congressional prerogatives in the determination of the policy relating to
union liability under the Sherman Act. See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 668-69.
30. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
31. The union in Allen Bradley conspired, in the context of collective bargaining, with
contractors and manufacturers who sought to establish a closed market in New York City for
electrical components, electrical contracting, and labor. Id.
32. Id. at 810.
33. Id. at 799, 807, 810.
34. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
35. COHEN, supra note 12, at 378-79.
36. Id. at 379.
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ary activities were denominated "unfair labor practices" and pro-
scribed in section 8 of the LMRAY Both a private action and a
National Labor Relations Board enforcement procedure were cre-
ated to deter unions from engaging in these illegal activities .3 The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,'3
(LMRDA) placed further legislative control on union secondary ac-
tivities by closing loopholes that had appeared in section 8 of the
LMRA.4 ° Viewed together, the LMRA and the LMRDA arguably
evidenced a congressional scheme, in the context of labor legisla-
tion, to outlaw and to provide new remedies for the use of certain
union secondary activities which, although in the nature of antitrust
violations, seemed to be shielded by the statutory immunity recog-
nized in Hutcheson.41
Judicial intervention did not recur significantly until 1965 when
a sharply divided Supreme Court simultaneously rendered two im-
portant decisions relating to the antitrust exemption.42 The first
case, UMW v. Pennington," arose when a union, in return for in-
creased wages, promised one group of employers that it would de-
mand similar wages from other employers regardless of their ability
to pay. The alleged intent was to drive small competitors out of
business." Conceding that wage bargaining was a legitimate union
function, Justice White, speaking for the Court, stated that the
clear showing of a union's agreement with some employers to impose
wage demands on others would cause a forfeiture of antitrust im-
munity. Citing Apex Hosiery rather than Hutcheson or the labor
37. LMRA § 8, as amended 29 U.S.C. 158 (1970).
38. LMRA §§ 10, 303, as amended 29 U.S.C. 160, 187 (1970).
39. LMRDA, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
40. Of particular concern were so-called "hot cargo" contracts whereby an employer
voluntarily agreed not to deal with another "unfair" employer. Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA
prohibited union officials from encouraging union members not to work with products made
or shipped by an unfair employer, but did not limit "hot cargo" contracts that achieved the
same results. Another loophole involved the § 8(b)(4) prohibition against union encourage-
ment of concerted refusals by employees to deal with the goods or services of a neutral
employer. The possibility of union pressure being applied to individual employees, that is,
encouragement of unconcerted secondary activities, was left open. LAB. REL. REP., LRX 725-
27 (1974); COHEN, supra note 12, at 388-89.
41. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 376-84; Meltzer, supra note 10, at 702-14.
42. The Justices split into three groups of three, the same in each case. Mr. Justice
White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan, rendered the opinion of the Court
in each case. For a summary of the positions taken by the remaining Justices, see notes 45
and 49 infra.
43. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
44. Under the agreement, union members would benefit from higher wages while the
large coal producers would benefit through lessened competition-small producers, unable
to bear the burden of high labor costs would be forced to discontinue operations. Id. at 659-
61.
[Vol. 281342
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statutes, he declared that federal labor policy did not condone such
agreements and implied that no anticompetitive intent need be
shown in order to deny immunity.45 The second case, Local 189,
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.," involved a multiemployer collec-
tive bargaining agreement that imposed specific limitations on the
operating hours of employers. An employer bound by the agreement
claimed that it had restricted competition by preventing business
operations in which the union did not participate and had no legiti-
mate interest. 47 Justice White, writing again for the Court 4" and
finding no conspiracy between the union and the contracting em-
ployers, limited the issue to whether the union's interest was "inti-
mately related" to the attainment of satisfactory working hours for
its members. Finding such a relationship, he held, again without
reference to federal labor legislation, that federal labor policy im-
munized the union from antitrust liability." The Pennington and
Jewel Tea cases, though arguably inconsistent in their results, ap-
45. The decision was reversed and remanded, despite the apparent finding of liability,
because of an error in the instructions to the jury during the trial. Justices Douglas, Black,
and Clark, in a concurring opinion, construed the opinion of the Court as a reaffirmance of
Allen Bradley. Emphasizing deference to federal legislation in the labor field, the Justices
nevertheless stated that the alleged activity of the UMW, if proved, would be a prima facie
violation of the Sherman Act for which immunity would not be appropriate. Id. at 672-75.
Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart, dissenting from the opinion of the Court but concur-
ring in the result, stated that the Court was determining social and economic policy contrary
to the will of Congress. Finding that wages were, by statute, a mandatory subject for collective
bargaining, the dissenters reasoned that under Hutcheson neither the bargaining itself nor
the contract before the Court could be the subject of an antitrust action. They stated that
judicial determinations of the motives underlying a union's outwardly legitimate bargaining
activities were both futile and dangerous. Id. at 698-735.
46. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
47. The contract prevented employers from selling fresh meat between the hours of 6
p.m. and 9 a.m. on weekdays or at any time on Sundays. Similar provisions had been inserted
in the union's contracts since 1920, prior to which time butchers had been required to work
over eighty hours per week. Jewel Tea Company's complaint arose from the fact that the
contract prevented it from operating self-service meat counters in its grocery stores. Id. at
694-96.
48. See note 42 supra.
49. The opinion in which Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart dissented from the
Court's opinion in Pennington, but concurred in the result, also served as their concurring
opinion in Jewel Tea. Like Pennington, Jewel Tea was viewed as a case involving a
statutorily-mandated subject for collective bargaining-working hours. The concurring Jus-
tices therefore reasoned that there was no antitrust liability under the theory that the union's
actions had been legislatively legitimized. The concurring Justices further stated that the
Court should not look beyond the statutory justification for the union's activity, there being
no judicial aptitude or criteria for analyzing the social or economic appropriateness of that
activity. 381 U.S. at 696-735. Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark dissented in Jewel Tea,
arguing that the collective bargaining contract itself was evidence of a conspiracy to restrain
competition. They contended that the Court was confusing working hours with marketing
hours and that the union's members had no direct or immediate interest in the latter. Id.
735-38.
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peared to signal the Supreme Court's resurrection, over the vigorous
protest of some of its members, of the pre-Hutcheson nonstatutory
antitrust exemption based on judicial conceptions of economically
acceptable union activity.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In the instant case, the Supreme Court initially acknowledged
that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts exempted labor unions
and some of their activities from the proscriptions of federal anti-
trust law." Citing Mr. Justice White's opinions in Pennington and
Jewel Tea,51 the Court further noted that the need for reconciling
the congressional policies favoring collective bargaining and com-
petitive markets was the source of a nonstatutory antitrust exemp-
tion which recognizes that legitimate union-employer agreements
inevitably effect restraints on business markets." Relying on Allen
Bradley, however, the Court observed that neither of these exemp-
tions protected anticompetitive dealings between unions and nonla-
bor entities that do not employ the union's members. 3
Addressing defendant's claim of nonstatutory immunity, the
Court examined the actual and potential effects of defendant's
agreement with plaintiff and found them to be highly anticompeti-
tive. 4 Acknowledging that defendant's ultimate motive of organiz-
ing as many subcontractors as possible was legal in itself, the Court
emphasized that defendant did not represent or seek to represent
any of plaintiff's employees.5 The Court then reasoned that, since
the agreement was both unrelated to the federal policy favoring
collective bargaining and inimical to the federal policy favoring
competitive markets, the protection afforded by the nonstatutory
antitrust exemption was inappropriate.
The Court next considered defendant's claim of statutory im-
munity under the construction industry proviso of section 8(e) of the
LMRDA.55 The Court admitted that the restrictive subcontracting
50. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975). See note
27 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 42, 45 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
52. 421 U.S. at 622-23. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
54. The Court found that the agreement, in light of the "most favored nation" clause
in defendant's multiemployer collective bargaining contract, served to exclude nonunion
subcontractors from the Dallas market, assured that subcontractors unaffiliated with the
Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas would not outcompete members of that asso-
ciation, and gave the defendant control over access to the market for subcontracted labor in
the plumbing and mechanical trades. 421 U.S. 623-25.
55. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 6 supra.
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agreement comported with the statutory language but questioned
whether it nonetheless violated the intent of Congress. Supplement-
ing an analysis of legislative intent with case authority, the Court
construed the proviso to except agreements pertaining to secondary
activities on a single construction site from categorization as unfair
labor practices. 57 The Court, noting that the agreement in question
obligated plaintiff to restrict its subcontracting on all its jobsites,
asserted that the reading of the proviso urged by defendant would
provide unions with precisely the sort of unlimited economic
weapon that Congress sought to outlaw in section 8 of the LMRDA.5'
Finding no clear evidence of a congressional intent to preserve the
legality of such a coercive organizational tactic, the Court rejected
defendant's claim of statutory antitrust immunity.
Turning to defendant's final argument that the LMRDA pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for violations of its unfair labor practices
provisions,"0 the Court held that, despite defendant's apparent vio-
lation of section 8(e), the remedy provided by labor statutes was
irrelevant in determining whether antitrust sanctions were applica-
ble.6" The Court thus concluded that under the facts presented the
defendant was neither nonstatutorily nor statutorily immunized
from federal antitrust liability"' and that its restrictive subcontract-
ing agreement with plaintiff was a proper basis for a suit under the
Sherman Act."
IV. COMMENT
The immediate import of the instant decision is its reassertion
of the applicability of federal antitrust law to certain types of union
secondary activities. By holding that section 8(e) of the LMRA does
not necessarily insulate unions from antitrust liability and that the
private action provided by the LMRA for violations of section 8(e)
is not exclusive, the Court made clear its view that federal labor
57. 421 U.S. at 626-34.
58. See notes 35, 37 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
60. 421 U.S. at 635.
61. The Court affirmed the finding of the lower courts that the violations of state
antitrust law alleged by plaintiff were preempted on the theory that federal labor and anti-
trust statutes operated in the field and, therefore, conflict between federal and state policies
could not be permitted. 421 U.S. at 635-37.
62. Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from the opinion of the
Court, arguing that the majority's analysis of the legislative intent underlying section 8(e) of
the LMRDA was incorrect and that the exclusive remedy in the instant case was provided
by 29 U.S.C. 187 (§ 303 of the LMRA). The dissent concluded by stating that the majority
was imposing liability contrary to the clear intent of Congress and was threatening to destroy
the balance between employer and employee power provided by federal labor legislation.
1975] 1345
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legislation has not wholly displaced the Sherman Act when unions
are involved." To have held otherwise, however, would have been
to violate the established judicial principle permitting a finding of
statutory repeal by implication under only the clearest of circum-
stances." Whether Congress intended section 8 of the LMRA to
supplant the Sherman Act is debatable given the legislative history
cited by the Court. 5 Nevertheless, the instant holding, that a Sher-
man action exists for what was apparently an unfair labor practices
violation, appears to render both section 8(e) and the private action
created for its enforcement somewhat superfluous. The same may
be true for section 8 generally. The reason is that the instant holding
probably will encourage potential plaintiffs in unfair labor practices
suits to bring actions under the Sherman Act instead, in the hope
of recovering treble damages and attorney's fees.66 When such an
action is brought, the Court appears willing to thoroughly scrutinize
the language of the applicable labor statute and its underlying pur-
poses, the collective bargaining relationships between union and
nonlabor entities, and the market effects of secondary organiza-
tional tactics in determining whether a union is entitled to statutory
antitrust immunity. Thus, the instant decision should discourage
unions from participating in questionable secondary practices hav-
ing markedly anticompetitive effects for which statutory antitrust
immunity may provide no shelter.
In addition to raising the issue of whether Congress has in fact
achieved a satisfactory legislative accommodation of federal labor
and antitrust policy, the instant case poses the question whether it
is prudent to leave the task of defining legitimate union activity in
light of the Sherman Act 7 to the judiciary. As shown by the instant
decision, the answer to both of these questions must be in the nega-
tive. The LMRA and the LMRDA, though obviously representing a
congressional intent to limit the economic power of unions,68 contain
the same fundamental flaw that was present in the NLRA and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act." They do not integrate the definitions of
63. See notes 58 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Metropolitan Area Transit
Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968).
65. The dissent's citations to the legislative debates in support of its position seem
equally as persuasive as those of the Court. See 421 U.S. 616, 640-54. See note 62 supra.
66. For an early case under the Sherman Act holding that union members were jointly
liable for treble damages and attorney's fees see Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), cited
in note 12 supra.
67. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 27 supra.
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proper and improper union activity with a corresponding limitation
on the scope of union liability under antitrust law. The Supreme
Court's 1941 Hutcheson opinion, founded upon a strained interde-
pendent interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts,
doubtless has become obsolete with the passage of the LMRA and
LMRDA and therefore contributes little in resolving conflicts be-
tween antitrust and unfair labor practices liability.
The instant decision demonstrates the inability of the Court, on
its own or with the meager guidance provided by Congress, to dis-
cern a clear standard by which to measure the propriety of union
organizational activity in light of current federal labor and antitrust
law. Faced with a fact pattern that did not embody an apparent
anticompetitive intent, a classic conspiracy between labor and non-
labor entities, or activity clearly unrelated to the legitimate union
interest in achieving better wages and working conditions, the Court
was forced to abandon the "clear showing" test of Pennington,"0 the
"intimately related" test of Jewel Tea7' and, perhaps, even the Allen
Bradley doctrine. 72 Instead, the Court applied a balancing standard
the precise nature of which remains unarticulated. The instant
opinion therefore provides little guidance for unions or the federal
judiciary and leaves the function of the unfair labor practices provi-
sions of the LMRA as amended by the LMRDA somewhat in doubt.
The competing values involved in the instant case are exceedingly
complex. If a satisfactory accommodation of the two seemingly irre-
concilable national policies favoring labor organization and compet-
itive markets is to be made, however, the Supreme Court's opinion
in the instant case is an indication that the solution inevitably will
have to come from Congress.
LAURENCE M. HAMRIc
70. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 42, 46 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text; see note 45 supra.
1975] 1347
1348 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
Constitutional Law - Interstate Commerce -
Extortion - Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under
Hobbs Act Satisfied by Showing Potential Effect
On Commerce
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant, a city alderman,' was indicted under the Hobbs
Act 2 for obstructing, delaying, and affecting interstate commerce by
extorting payments from a property owner in exchange for support
of a zoning ordinance amendment that permitted construction of an
animal hospital.3 Despite enactment of the requisite zoning modifi-
cations, 4 the animal hospital was never built.' Although no proof
was adduced that the alleged extortion had any actual effect on
interstate commerce, testimony established that the proposed con-
struction would have required the use of out-of-state building mate-
rials.6 The federal government contended that any potential ob-
1. The defendant was Casimir Staszcuk, an elected alderman from the 13th ward of
Chicago.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). Defendant Staszcuk might have been prosecuted under state
law. 38 ILL. ANN. STATS. § 33-3 (Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
A public officer or employee commits misconduct when, in his official capacity, he
commits any of the following acts...
(d) Solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance of any act a fee or reward
which he knows is not authorized by law.
3. In September 1970 William Harris reached an agreement with a veterinarian to build
an animal hospital on Harris' property in the 13th ward of Chicago. Such a use of the land
was proscribed by existing zoning ordinances. In an effort to procure an amendment to the
zoning laws, which would permit him to build the animal hospital, Harris paid $5,500 to Al
C. Allen, known in Chicago as "the zoning man." Allen discussed the matter with Alderman
Staszcuk, and on September 15, 1970, an amendatory ordinance was introduced in the City
Council. On December 8, 1970, the zoning man paid the alderman $3,000 to refrain from
opposing the amendment. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
The evidence indicated that Staszcuk accepted two other payments of $3,000 from Allen
in return for support of similar zoning amendments relating to two other pieces of property
in the 13th ward. Staszcuk ultimately was indicted for four counts of mail fraud, two counts
of filing false income tax returns, and three counts of Hobbs Act violations. Prior to the
instant appeal, defendant was convicted on four of the counts. At issue in the instant case is
Count I of the indictment for violation of the Hobbs Act by means of extortion. Id. at 55-
56; United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974) (panel decision).
4. Following a public hearing on December 8, 1970, the Council zoning committee
'deferred action on the matter. On January 27, 1971, the ordinance was approved by the
committee and adopted by the City Council. Harris was then free to construct the animal
hospital. 517 F.2d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1975).
5. In March 1971 Harris received bids on the animal hospital from three contractors.
For unexplained reasons, the veterinarian backed out of the deal and the hospital was never
built. Instead, Harris erected buildings that were proper under the previous zoning ordinance.
Id.
6. Testimony was taken from only one of the three bidders. He testified that in his
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struction, delay, or effect on commerce invokes federal criminal
jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act, provided that at the time of the
offense there was a reasonable probability that the extortion would
have affected interstate commerce. 7 Defendant argued that when a
threatened effect on commerce fails to materialize there is an insuf-
ficient nexus with interstate commerce to satisfy Hobbs Act juris-
dictional requirements. Adopting the liberal standard of federal
criminal jurisdiction advanced by the Government, the District
Court found defendant guilty of extortion affecting commerce in
violation of the Hobbs Act.' A panel of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that when a potential effect on com-
merce fails to materialize federal Hobbs Act jurisdiction is for-
feited On rehearing before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
sitting en banc, held, reversed. Absent an actual effect on com-
merce, federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act is satisfied by show-
ing that at the time of the offense there was a realistic probability
that the robbery or extortion would have affected interstate com-
merce. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Constitution granted Congress the power to regulate com-
merce among the several states 0 to secure freedom of trade and to
insure the free flow of goods." Expansive judicial interpretation of
opinion the proposed construction would have involved cast iron plumbing fixtures, plate
glass, electrical fixtures, and a furnace manufactured outside of Illinois. The evidence showed
that the witness' company had been involved in the construction of four comparable animal
hospitals in the past five years, and that he was unaware of any Illinois source for the
materials. Id. at n.5.
7. The Government argued that the extortion eliminated defendant's possible opposi-
tion to the removal of a restriction that prevented Harris from building the hospital; if Harris
had not changed his plans, the construction of the hospital would have involved the use of
out-of-state materials. Id. at 56.
8. The District Court's opinion is not reported.
9. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974).
10. "The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. Justice Rutledge described the central purpose of the commerce clause as follows:
It was . . . to secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow, that
the Annapolis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view to Philadelphia. Thus
the generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon
commerce which the Confederation could not check. These were the proximate cause of
our national existence down to today. . . . No prohibition of trade barriers as among
the states could have been effective of its own force or by trade agreements. It had
become apparent that such treaties were too difficult to negotiate and the process of
securing them was too complex for this method to give the needed relief. Power adequate
to make and enforce the prohibition was required. Hence, the necessity for creating an
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the commerce clause has established that Congress has plenary
power1 2 to regulate all aspects of the economy affecting interstate
commerce. 13 Federal regulation of purely intrastate economic activ-
ity has been permitted when the activity directly affects interstate
commerce or contributes to a class of activities affecting com-
merce. 4 In contrast to the wide latitude of congressional power in
the economic realm, federal commerce power in the criminal do-
main has not received corresponding expansive treatment from the
judiciary.15 Although the courts frequently have sustained federal
criminal statutes proscribing the misuse of the channels of inter-
state commerce and protecting the instrumentalities of commerce,"6
the judiciary traditionally has disapproved legislation punishing
local criminal conduct that incidentally affects interstate commerce
absent exceptional circumstances.1 7 This judicial reluctance to ex-
entirely new scheme of government.
W. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25-6 (1947); see E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF
THE SUPREME COURT 17 (1934); P. FENN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 411 (1948);
B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 229 (1963); Bogen,
The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Congressional Power Under the
Commerce Clause. 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187 (1972).
12. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Hanley v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 187 U.S. 617, 619 (1903).
13. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). For a historical development of the commerce power see P. BENSON, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 1937-1970 (1970); Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946); Stem,
That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1335 (1934); Stem,
The Problems of Yesteryear - Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REV. 446 (1951); Stem,
The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A.J. 823 (1955). See also Bogen, supra
note 11, at 190.
14. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941); accord, Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); see Stem,
59 HARV. L. REV., supra note 13. An individual showing of effect on commerce is unnecessary
if Congress determines that in the aggregate the class of activities affects interstate com-
merce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); accord, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971).
But see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971).
15. See generally 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805; 46 TuL. L. REV. 829, 833 (1972).
16. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); see, e.g., Brooks v. United
States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (stolen motor vehicles); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470
(1917) (women for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321
(1903) (sale of lottery tickets). See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971);
Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3
MINN. L. REV. 289, 297 (1919); Stem, The Commerce Clause Revsited - The Federalization
of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 273 (1973); 32 MICH. L. REV. 378 (1934); 1972 U.
ILL. L. F. 805.
17. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
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tend the reach of federal commerce power to local crime derives
from the American system of federalism, which historically has allo-
cated the power to define and punish crimes to the states. 18 Recog-
nizing that federal police resources are limited, 9 that local authori-
ties are better situated to enforce criminal laws, and that duplici-
tous federal criminal legislation encourages relaxation of essential
state law enforcement efforts, 0 the courts steadfastly have resisted
alteration of the sensitive federal-state balance of criminal jurisdic-
tion. As a general principle, ambiguities in federal criminal statutes
have been construed narrowly. 2' Additionally, the courts have re-
fused to uphold criminal legislation federalizing intrastate crimes
unless Congress clearly articulates an intention to change the
federal-state balance of power in the criminal domain. 22
Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase
in federal utilization of the commerce clause power to punish here-
tofore purely local crimes that incidentally affect interstate com-
merce." Reasoning that the national government can manage most
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1241 (tent. ed. 1958); see
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
18. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 17; see 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805.
19. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bogen, supra note 11, at 195.
20. See 72 CONG. REC. 6214 (1930) (letter from the Attorney General to the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
21. Ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); see Ladner v. United States, 358
U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (plurality opinion).
22. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); see Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947).
In Bass the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defendant for possessing firearms
in violation of section 1202(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.
APP. § 1202(a) (1970), because the Government did not allege or prove that the firearms had
been possessed in or used in a manner affecting commerce. Given the "meager legislative
history," the failure of Congress to specify clearly its intentions, and the ambiguity of the
Act, the Court refused to read the statute in a way that would alter the federal-state balance
of criminal jurisdiction. "[T]he legislative history provides scanty basis for concluding that
Congress faced these serious questions and meant to affect the federal-state balance in the
way now claimed by the Government." 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971). For commentary on the Bass
case see 2 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 441 (1972).
23. See Stern, supra note 16; 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805; see, e.g., Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971). See also Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role
of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 841 (1972). In Perez the Supreme Court upheld
the application of the federal anti-loansharking statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970), to a
purely intrastate credit transaction without requiring an interstate commerce nexus. Given
the congressional finding that the class of activities affected commerce, the Court held that
it was unnecessary to demonstrate an actual effect on interstate commerce in the individual
case. For commentary on Perez see Bog6n, supra note 11; Levine, The Proposed New Federal
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effectively problems not indigenous to individual states2 and that
states require federal law enforcement assistance,2s Congress has
federalized intrastate crimes in three situations. 2 First, local crimes
have been subjected to federal control in order to protect a particu-
lar federal interest or involvement.Y Second, federal action has been
impelled when local officials are unwilling or unable to prosecute
criminal activity.2s Finally, federal criminal power under the com-
merce clause has been exercised when the aggregate effect of local
crimes exerts a nationwide impact on interstate commerce. 29
One crime traditionally controlled by local authorities that has
been subjected to at least partial federal control is extortion." The
first congressional attempt to criminalize extortion at the federal
level was the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 31 a statute designed to
curb the exaction of payments from industry by threat of labor
unrest.3 2 The Anti-Racketeering Act provided criminal penalties for
persons who in any way or degree affected interstate commerce by
threat of force, fear, violence, or coercion in order to obtain money
or property.3 The scope of the Act, however, was curtailed sharply
Criminal Code: A Constitutional and Jurisdictional Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1972);
Stern, supra note 16; 49 TEXAS L. REV. 568 (1971); 46 TuL. L. REV. 829 (1972). See also 1972
L. & Soc. ORDER 683.
24. Stem, supra note 16, at 285.
25. Id. at 283.
26. One commentator has argued that the potential costs of federal non-involvement
generally are (1) delay, (2) potential weakening of federal rights, (3) erosion of the right to a
federal forum, and (4) decreased confidence in the ability of federal courts to execute their
primary functions. Hufstedler, supra note 23, at 869.
27. See 5 LOYOLA (CHIcAGo) U.L.J. 513, 534 (1974).
28. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 17; Stem, Prosecutions of Local Political Corrup-
tion Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3
SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1971).
29. See Stem, supra note 16, at 285.
30. United States v. Laudani, 134 F.2d 847, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 U.S. 543 (1944).
31. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
32. See articles cited note 37 infra.
33. The Anti-Racketeering Act provided in pertinent part:
Sec. 2. Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in
any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to
move in trade or commerce -
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force,
violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the
purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the pay-
ment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force
or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b); or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any of the
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by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Teamsters
Local 807,11 which exempted the activities of organized labor from
the ambit of the statute.35 In direct response to the Court's restric-
tive holding in Teamsters Local 807,3 Congress enacted the Hobbs
Act 7 in 1946 as an amendment to the Anti-Racketeering Act.3" The
Hobbs Act punishes any person who "in any way or degree ob-
structs, delays, or affects commerce," or attempts or conspires to do
so,3' by robbery or extortion."0 Although the general purpose of the
foregoing acts; shall upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished
by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both.
Sec. 3 . . . (b) The terms "property," "money," or "valuable considerations" used
herein shall not be deemed to include wages paid by a bona-fide employer to a bona-
fide employee. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, §§ 2, 3(b), 48 Stat. 979, 979-80.
34. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
35. See articles cited note 37 infra.
36. "The sole purpose of the bill is is undo the outrageous opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Teamsters Union Case ... " 91 CONG. Rc. 11841 (1945) (remarks of Representative
Cox).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 3, 1946, ch. 537, 60 Stat.
420). For a general history of the Hobbs Act see Brown & Peer, The Anti-Racketeering Act:
Labor and Management Weapon Against Labor Racketeering, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 965, 968-72
(1957); Stern, supra note 28, at 1-3; 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1291, 1291-95 (1973); 35
GEO. L.J. 362 (1947); 25 N.C.L. REv. 58 (1946).
38. For an analysis of the difference between the two statutes see 35 GEO. L.J. 362, 364-
66 (1947); 5 LOYOLA (CHICAGO) U.L.J. 513, 516 (1974); 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1030, 1033-34 (1953).
39. An attempt or conspiracy to commit robbery or extortion under the Hobbs Act does
not require an intent to affect commerce. It is sufficient if the natural effect of the attempt
or conspiracy affects commerce. United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 311-12 (7th Cir.
1968), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310
(1969); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944
(1968); United States v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 159-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957).
40. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970), provides:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the move-
ment of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or
conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section -
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means
of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,
to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person
or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company
at the time of the taking or obtaining. (2) The term "extortion" means the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or
any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any
point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any
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Act ostensibly was to remove artificial restraints on the free flow of
goods,4" Congress specifically intended to proscribe the levy of
"blackmail upon industry" by labor racketeers.4 2 Congress deter-
mined that the aggregate effect of labor racketeering interfered with
a segment of national industry of sufficient importance to merit
federal protection, particularly since state officials in the 1930's
were unwilling or unable to control these criminal activities. 3 Nev-
ertheless, the Hobbs Act is couched in broad terms and applies not
only to labor racketeering, but to all robbery and extortion obstruct-
ing, delaying, or affecting interstate commerce.44 As such, the fed-
eral government in recent years has utilized the Act as a major
weapon for attacking local political corruption that affects inter-
state commerce.45
The statutory language, legislative history, and judicial inter-
pretation of the Hobbs Act evidence a congressional intent to exer-
cise full commerce clause power to punish robbery and extortion
affecting interstate commerce. In the statute itself, Congress de-
fined "commerce" as encompassing "all. . .commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction."4 Similarly, the legislative his-
tory of the Hobbs Act and its predecessor indicates that the statute
was designed "to extend Federal jurisdiction over all restraints of
any commerce within the scope of the Federal Government's consti-
tutional powers. ' 47 This expansive interpretation of the scope of
place outside such state; and all other commerce over which the United States
has jurisdiction.
41. 78 CONG. REC. 453 (1934) (memorandum submitted by Walter L. Rice, Special
Assistant to the Attorney General); 5 LOYOLA (CHIcAGO) U.L.J. 513, 516 (1974).
42. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. pt. 1, at 1 (1933). Judge Learned Hand described the purpose of the Hobbs Act as
follows:
For a number of years before 1934 - at least in the City of New York - the levy of
blackmail upon industry, especially upon relatively small shops, had become very seri-
ous, and the local authorities either would not, or could not, check it. The courts were
powerless, because the witnesses were terrorized and could not be protected if they told
what they knew; the public felt themselves at the mercy of organized gangs of bandits
and became wrought up over the situation. It was, at least primarily, to check such
Camorras that Congress passed this measure. United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 118
F.2d 684, 687-88 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
43. See note 42, supra; 32 MIcH. L. REv. 378, 379 (1934).
44. United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Carbo v. United States,
314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964).
45. See Stern, supra note 28, at 1; 5 LOYOLA (CHICAGO) U.L.J. 513 (1974); see, e.g.,
United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (3) (1970). The definition of commerce in the Anti-Racketeering
Act encompassed "all other trade or commerce over which the United States has constitu-
tional jurisdiction." Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, § 1, 48 Stat. 979.
47. SEN. REP. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); see 78 CONG. REc. 453 (1934)
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Hobbs Act jurisdiction was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Stirone v. United States,4 8 in which the Court held that the broad
language of the Hobbs Act manifests "a purpose to use all the con-
stitutional power Congress has to punish interference with inter-
state commerce by extortion. . . ,,. In light of the language of the
statute, its legislative history, and the Stirone decision, the courts
consistently have held that a de minimis effect on commerce satis-
fies the federal jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbs Act." Addi-
tionally, language in several federal circuit court cases suggested
that a potential impact on interstate commerce is sufficient to in-
voke Hobbs Act jurisdiction. In Hulahan v. United States51 a union
representative, threatening labor unrest, successfully extorted pay-
ments from construction companies involved in interstate com-
merce. The Eighth Circuit stated: "We have no doubt that Congress
has the power to deal with extortion or attempted extortion actually
or potentially affecting interstate commerce ..... '2 The Seventh
Circuit espoused a similar rule in United States v. Pranno,53 which
involved a conspiracy by city officials to extort money from a prop-
erty owner and a building contractor by threatening to withhold a
building permit. Since the extortion money was paid, the interstate
movement of building materials remained uninterrupted. Neverthe-
less, the court discerned a sufficient commerce nexus, explaining
that it was only necessary to prove that commerce would have been
delayed had the threat been carried out. The Seventh Circuit ob-
served that "[t]he statute seems to be read as not only prohibiting
the obstruction of commerce by extortion, but also prohibiting ex-
tortion by any threat, the carrying out of which would obstruct
commerce. ' '54 In United States v. Augello 5 defendant successfully
extorted payments from a restaurant owner who purchased out-of-
state meat products, in return for protection against interference
(memorandum submitted by Walter L. Rice, Special Assistant to the Attorney General).
48. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
49. Id. at 215.
50. United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shackle-
ford, 494 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974); United States v. Gill, 490
F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969 (1974); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1021 (1970). The effect on commerce need not be direct or substantial. United States
v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972); United States v.
Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
51. 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954).
52. Id. at 445.
53. 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968).
54. Id. at 389.
55. 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972).
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with his business. "Given the sweeping power of Congress under the
commerce clause, particularly evident in the Hobbs Act," noted the
Second Circuit, "it is enough that the extortion 'in any way or
degree' affects commerce, though its effect be merely potential or
subtle.""6 Despite the suggestion in Hulahan, Pranno, and Augello
that a potential effect on commerce satisfies federal Hobbs Act
jurisdiction, there was an actual effect on commerce in each case.
In Hulahan and Augello the extortionate transactions actually af-
fected commerce by diminishing the resources of companies en-
gaged in or dependent upon interstate commerce; in Pranno some
building material had already been brought into the state. Since the
"potential effect" language in these cases was unnecessary to the
holdings, the instant case afforded the first clear opportunity to
consider the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Hobbs Act to robbery and extortion having only a potential or
threatened effect on interstate commerce.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court 7 initially discerned that the general purpose
of the Hobbs Act - to secure freedom of trade - unambiguously
parallels the central purpose of the commerce clause." Given this
coextensive purpose, the court reasoned that Congress was free to
exercise power under the Hobbs Act commensurate with the exten-
sive power granted by its constitutional predicate. Noting that the
language of the Hobbs Act, its legislative history, and its interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court in Stirone all confirm an intent by Con-
gress to exercise its full powers under the commerce clause, the
court concluded that the statute must receive an expansive con-
struction. Characterizing extortion by public officials as a species of
"blackmail upon industry," the court ascertained that Congress
intended the Hobbs Act to apply to local political corruption. 9 The
court explained that federal control over this type of local political
corruption is justified by the harmful nationwide consequences of
56. Id. at 1169.
57. The majority opinion was written by Judge Stevens. He was joined by Chief Judge
Fairchild, Judge Cummings, Judge Tone, and Judge Bauer. Judge Sprecher dissented for the
reasons set forth in his panel opinion. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974). Judge Swygert concurred
with Judge Sprecher's dissent and also dissented on a voir.dire issue. Judge Pell also filed a
dissenting opinion.
58. See.notes 11 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
59. "[Wle have no doubt that the extortion revealed by this record is a species of the
'blackmail upon industry' that Congress mustered its full power to eradicate. The muscle of
the faithless public servant is just as intolerable as the muscle of the Camorras described by
Judge Hand." 517 F.2d at 59.
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the class of transactions to which defendant's extortion contributes.
Reasoning that an effective prohibition of "blackmail upon indus-
try" must be broad enough to encompass those cases in which the
illegal payments are actually made and the threatened effect on
commerce fails to materialize, the court inferred that Congress in-
tended the Hobbs Act to apply whenever there is a potential impact
on interstate commerce."0 Thus the court discerned that Hulahan,
Pranno, and Augello correctly interpreted the congressional pur-
pose."A Holding that federal criminal jurisdiction under the Hobbs
Act is satisfied by demonstrating that at the time of the offense
there was a realistic probability that the extortionate transaction
would have affected interstate commerce, the court concluded that
the evidence in the instant case supported a finding that the pro-
posed construction would have affected commerce.2
The dissenting opinion 3 observed that the plain meaning of the
statutory language does not comport with the majority's construc-
tion of the Hobbs Act. 4 The ordinary meanings of the jurisdictional
words - "obstruct," "delay," and "affect" - import the concept
of accomplishment, explained the dissent. Disagreeing with the
majority's interpretation of the legislative history of the Act, the
60. "An effective prohibition against blackmail must be broad enough to include the
case in which the tribute is paid as well as the one in which a victim is harmed for refusing
to submit. Since the payment would normally enable the business to continue without inter-
ruption, the inference is inescapable that Congress was as much concerned with the threat-
ened impact of the prohibited conduct as with its actual effect." Id. at 57.
61. The court also cited a similar case, United States v. Tropiano, 418 F:2d 1069 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970). Another case relied upon by the court was
United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972), which
observed that there is no requirement that "the company be engaged in an interstate transac-
tion at the moment of the extortion to support federal jurisdiction." Id. at 836.
62. "The jury could reasonably infer that . . . there was then a likelihood that the
movement across state lines of a furnace, plate glass, and plumbing and electrical fixtures
would be affected." 517 F.2d at 60.
Furthermore, the court argued that federal jurisdiction should not be defeated by the
fortuitous circumstance that, after the crime had been committed, a change of plans occurred
and the animal hospital was never built. Id. "Nor would appellant have been any less culpa-
ble," the majority maintained, "if for some unanticipated reason the [zoning amendment]
had not in fact passed .... Conversely if on December 8, 1970, no effect on interstate
commerce had been foreseeable, a subsequent decision creating an interstate nexus would not
retroactively convert a possible state offense into a federal crime." Id. at 60 n.19.
63. The dissent was written by Judge Pell. Judge Sprecher filed a dissent which incor-
porated his panel opinion for the majority. Sprecher was unable to discern any precedent in
Pranno and other cases, since in each instance there was an actual effect on commerce.
Sprecher concluded that "when the effect never materializes - despite the failure or success
of the extortion - the commerce element of the Hobbs Act is not established." 502 F.2d at
879.
64. Judge Pell cited Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), for the principle that "words
used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons
to the contrary." Id. at 580-81.
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dissent maintained that Congress in fact was more interested in
controlling local crime than in removing restraints on the free flow
of goods. Furthermore, the broad language of the Hobbs Act did not
signify to the dissent a congressional intent to extend the exercise
of legislative power to local conduct having no actual effect on inter-
state commerce. 5 Recognizing that other federal statutes in which
Congress intended to exercise its full commerce powers also contain
"affecting commerce" jurisdictional requirements, the dissent
noted that none of these statutes had received a corresponding ex-
pansive statutory construction6 The dissent distinguished
Hulahan, Pranno, and Augello as cases in which "potential effect"
language was unnecessary to the decisions. 7 Thus, perceiving no
basis for inferring a congressional intent to make the operation of
the Hobbs Act independent of any actual effect on interstate com-
merce, the dissent concluded that the majority holding represented
a substantially incorrect extension of federal jurisdiction into essen-
tially localized crime.
IV. COMMENT
As a case of first impression, the instant decision represents the
first significant expression of judicial willingness to sustain federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act in the absence of an
actual effect on interstate commerce. By holding that a potential
effect on commerce satisfies the jurisdictional nexus requirement of
the Act, the decision dramatically augments the power of the federal
government to punish the traditionally local crimes of robbery and
extortion, subject only to two restrictions. Hobbs Act jurisdiction
may be invoked when the Government proves that at the time of
the offense there was a realistic probability of a de minimis effect
on commerce and that federal concern is justified by the harmful
nationwide consequences of the class of activities to which the rob-
bery or extortion belongs. In light of the highly integrated modern
American economy, however, it is difficult to envision any robbery
or extortion that does not have a realistic probability of affecting
commerce to some degree or any such class of criminal activity that
65. Although the dissent failed to reach the question of whether Congress has the power
to reach potential effects on commerce, the dissent did indicate that it was not at all clear
that Congress possesses the requisite power to extend the exercise of legislative power to local
activities that have no effect whatsoever on interstate commerce. 517 F.2d at 63.
66. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), and its interpre-
tation in NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693
(1941), and NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
67. See text following note 56 supra.
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does not substantially injure interstate business. 8 Given these non-
rigorous limitations, it is apparent that the federal government now
retains ample power to reach virtually all robbery and extortion,
however attenuated the actual connection with interstate commerce
may be. More specifically, the instant decision provides federal au-
thorities with a highly potent weapon for attacking local political
corruption. If more active prosecution of robbery and extortion does
result, the decision may well encourage relaxation of essential state
law enforcement efforts in the robbery-extortion area. As such, the
case may alter significantly the delicate federal-state balance of
criminal jurisdiction.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the judiciary in future
robbery and extortion cases will embrace the instant court's expan-
sion of federal Hobbs Act jurisdiction. Because of analytical flaws
in the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, courts may be disinclined to
follow the decision. One major weakness in the court's analysis was
its underlying assumption that Congress is empowered under the
commerce clause to reach purely local activities that probably
would have affected commerce; such a proposition remains unsup-
ported by precedent. Furthermore, a significant omission in the
opinion was the court's failure to draw the traditional distinction
between federal commerce power in the economic and criminal
realms.' While the court correctly discerned that Congress intended
to exercise its plenary constitutional power in the Hobbs Act, it
failed to recognize that full commerce power in a criminal context
historically has never been commensurate with the wider scope of
commerce power in the economic realm. As such, the court's conclu-
sion that the Hobbs Act warrants expansive statutory construction
is seriously impaired. As the dissent pointed out, judicial interpreta-
tion of analogous federal statutes with "affecting commerce" juris-
dictional requirements does not comport with the majority's con-
struction of the Act. Despite the court's contention that Congress
intended to eradicate local political corruption as a species of
"blackmail upon industry," the legislative history of the statute
gives no indication that elimination of local political corruption was
specifically contemplated by the drafters of either the Hobbs Act or
the Anti-Racketeering Act.70 Furthermore, although Congress ascer-
tained that the aggregate effect of labor racketeering compelled fed-
68. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity"); 1972 L. & Soc. ORDER 683,
684; 49 TEXAS L. REV. 1106, 1107 (1971).
69. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
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eral action, there was no showing that local political corruption
exerted a nationwide effect on commerce of similar dimensions. It
is apparent, as the dissent perceived, that Congress was not as inter-
ested in securing freedom of trade under the Hobbs Act as it was in
proscribing crimes that local authorities were incapable of control-
ling.71 The instant court, however, failed to demonstrate that state
officials were either unwilling or unable to prosecute the defendant
for extortion.2 In addition, the majority's inference that Congress
intended the Hobbs Act to apply to potential effects on commerce
conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutory language; the con-
cept of "degree," as well as the ordinary meanings of "obstruct,"
"delay," and "affect," implies that some effect or impact on com-
merce, however insubstantial, is required. By broadly interpreting
the jurisdictional limits of the statute, the instant court ignored the
basic tenet of construction that ambiguities in criminal laws are
construed narrowly. Despite judicial admonition to the contrary,
the court extended the reach of federal criminal power under the
Hobbs Act in the absence of a clearly articulated expression of con-
gressional intent to that effect; as such, the decision is subject to
attack for statutory misconstruction. The decision is further weak-
ened by the court's disregard for the underlying policy implications
of its holding. The court failed to consider the extent to which local
authorities are better situated to control essentially local crimes,
limited federal resources may be drained by federal enforcement
efforts, state authorities may relax prosecution of robbery and extor-
tion, and the existing federal-state balance of criminal jurisdiction
may be altered. Finally, the instant decision was impaired by the
failure to specify adequate guidelines for implementing the "realis-
tic probability" test.
By extending federal jurisdiction to encompass all robbery and
extortion potentially affecting interstate commerce, the instant de-
cision not only reflects, but substantially contributes to, the increas-
ing federalization of intrastate crime under the commerce clause. In
light of the decision's broad rationale, the case may portend vir-
tually unlimited expansion of federal jurisdiction into the field of
crime control. At the very least, the decision constitutes authority
for extending the jurisdictional range of other "affecting commerce"
statutes to encompass all conduct potentially affecting commerce.
It is difficult to conceive of any criminal activity, no matter how
localized, that remains beyond the scope of the instant rationale.
71. See notes 43 & 69 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 2 supra for the text of an Illinois criminal statute under which defendant
might have been prosecuted.
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Additionally, the court's failure to distinguish between economic
and criminal commerce cases may presage expansion of federal
power in the criminal domain to the full extent of the commerce
clause power. In any event, further alteration of the delicate federal-
state balance of criminal jurisdiction should emanate not from the
judiciary, as in the instant case, but from the legislature. In consid-
ering federal criminal statutes designed to punish traditionally local
criminal conduct, however, future courts must evaluate carefully
whether the congressional purpose for such legislation is actually to
regulate commerce, or merely to reach local crime.
WILuAM G. ScoTT
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Search
and Seizure of Business Records by IRS Does Not
Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination or Fourth Amendment Right of
Privacy
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendants,' agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
searched' the office of plaintiff,' a dentist operating as a sole practi-
tioner, under authority of a valid search warrant4 and seized busi-
ness records5 for use against plaintiff as evidence in a contemplated
1. Defendants were three special agents of the Internal Revenue Service Intelligence
Division, joined with a United States Attorney and the government of the United States.
2. The search in dispute, conducted by six to eight IRS agents, began at approximately
8 a.m. on a business day and lasted approximately seven hours.
3. Plaintiff's wife, who worked as his secretary-receptionist, joined as co-plaintiff.
4. The search warrant was issued on the basis of defendant Wilson's affidavit setting
forth his belief that the items to be seized would support charges of tax evasion and filing a
false tax return. Attached to the application for a warrant were affidavits by former
employees of plaintiff that alleged existence of certain records, especially a so-called "cheat
book," which supposedly would document plaintiffs failure to report income in his tax return.
The instant court quoted from the warrant:
...there is now being concealed certain property, namely fiscal records relating to the
income and expenses of Dr. Wendall L. Shaffer from his dental practice and other
sources from January 1, 1966 to December 31, 1970, including, but not limited to, dental
patient cards, cash receipt books, cash disbursement books, expense records, business
ledgers, log books, bank ledger sheets and statements, deposit tickets, cancelled checks,
purchase invoices, copies of receipts covering payments of bills . , an approximately
5- J2" by 7"-paper pad-allegedly known as a "cheat book," . . . [and diverse other
records of financial transactions].
No. 74-1641 at 8-9 (bracketed material quoted only in dissenting opinion, No. 74-1641 at 1).
5. The seizure of some 18 cartons of financial and business records indicating income
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criminal action for tax evasion.' Plaintiff filed an action7 for return
of the seized records and suppression of any evidence obtained,8 for
damages,9 and for injunctive relief."0 Plaintiff maintained that sei-
zure of the records constituted a compulsory production of private
papers in violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination1 and that the search and seizure were unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. 2 Defendants contended that the re-
cords seized were neither evidence produced under compulsion nor
private papers entitled to fifth amendment protection and that the
search warrant was issued and executed properly. The trial court
accepted defendants' arguments and granted a motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
affirmed. The seizure, pursuant to a valid search warrant, of busi-
ness records of a sole proprietor, which could not be produced com-
pulsorily by summons or subpoena, does not violate either the indi-
vidual's privilege against self-incrimination or his fourth amend-
ment right of privacy. Shaffer v. Wilson, No. 74-167 (10th Cir., May
23, 1975).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures have been characterized by the Supreme
Court as seeking to protect the overlapping values represented in
and expenses and, according to plaintiff, nonfinancial personal and clinical records, resulted
from the search.
6. Plaintiff was suspected of violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion) and 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1) (filing a false or fraudulent tax statement).
7. Plaintiff filed the action on May 24, 1973, approximately 19 months after the search.
8. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part:
(e) Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the
return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the
property which was allegedly seized.
9. Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages in the amount of $12,000 from each of the
named defendants was based on the judicially created cause of action against federal agents
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
10. Plaintiff sought invocation of the court's equity powers to enjoin use of any evidence
gathered in the allegedly illegal search in any criminal proceeding against him, as well as the
suppression relief statutorily available under Rule 41(e).
11. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the "historic interests of 'self-protection.'""' In Boyd v. United
States," the Supreme Court first recognized that the two amend-
ments "run almost into each other"'5 when there is any "forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime. . . ."" The
Boyd decision invalidated on fourth and fifth amendment grounds
a revenue statute' 7 providing that failure of an individual to produce
records for government inspection would be deemed an admission
of the allegations contained in the production order application.
Because the individual's only alternative to producing the docu-
ments was an implicit admission of guilt, the Court found that the
statute compelled an individual to produce evidence against himself
in violation of the fifth amendment. The Boyd Court, in reaching
its decision, enunciated the "intimate relation" rationale, finding
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination places
limits on the items of evidence subject to compulsory production
under the fourth amendment. The greater importance of Boyd to
later cases, however, is its extension of the "intimate relation" ra-
tionale to searches and seizures. The Court stated in dictum" that
"a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory
production of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against
him . . . is . . . an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."I' Thirty-five years later,
13. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. 116 U.S. at 630. The Boyd Court elaborated on the relationship between the amend-
ments:
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling
a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable
to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against him-
self.
Id. at 633.
16. Id. at 630.
17. Act of June 22, 1974, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 186.
18. The governmental action challenged in Boyd was a court order to produce an invoice
allegedly establishing a violation of an import-duty statute; however, the Court broadened
the impact of its holding to include searches and seizures by stating in dictum that production
pursuant to a search warrant amounted to compulsory production equivalent to that com-
pelled by a court order. See note 15 supra.
19. 116 U.S. 616, 622. The Boyd Court supported its "intimate relation" rationale by
referring to Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765),
which struck down a search for evidence of seditious libel with the observation "that search
for evidence is disallowed" because it obligates a man to accuse himself. Entick v. Carrington,
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in Gouled v. United States,"0 the Court reiterated the Boyd proposi-
tion that certain items of evidence could never be the object of a
reasonable search and seizure. In Gouled, the Court established the
"mere evidence rule," holding that the taking under an apparently
valid warrant" of items of mere evidentiary value in which the gov-
ernment could assert no superior property right constituted an un-
reasonable search and seizure. 2 After many years of decreasing ap-
plication, 23 the Court in Warden v. Hayden24 rejected the "mere
evidence rule" as a means of determining whether evidence is sub-
ject to reasonable search and seizure. The Hayden Court held that
the test for invocation of fourth amendment protections is the ex-
quoted in 116 U.S. at 629. One commentator has pointed out that the search in Entich was
disallowed because of its general or exploratory nature (a concern later embodied in the fourth
amendment particularity requirement) rather than because of the incriminatory nature of the
records seized and was therefore inapplicable to the Boyd facts. Note, Evidentiary Searches:
The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEO. L.J. 593, 599 n.34 (1966).
20. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
21. Two searches had taken place in the Gouled case, one warrantless and one under a
warrant that met fourth amendment requirements of issuance upon a showing of probable
cause and a particular description of the items to be seized. Only that portion of the Gouled
decision concerning the latter search is of significance to this discussion.
22. In establishing the "mere evidence" rule, the Gouled Court listed those circumstan-
ces which would justify the government's assertion of a superior property right to items of
evidence when it observed that warrants:
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely
for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal
or penal proceeding, but. . . that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to
such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a
valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused
unlawful and provides that it may be taken.
255 U.S. at 309. The lower court in the instant case catalogued the classes of evidence seizable
under this rationale as developed by subsequent case law:
Evidence to which the government may assert a superior property right, and which is
therefore subject to search and seizure includes the following: stolen goods and contra-
band; records to be kept, and items fairly characterized as instrumentalities of crime
Shaffer v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D. Colo. 1974) (citations omitted).
23. The primary exception to the mere evidence rule appeared when the Supreme Court
approved the seizure and introduction of its evidence of items of purely evidential value in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court held that the taking
of a blood sample from a drunk-driving suspect over his objections was a compulsory taking
of "real or physical," rather than "testimonial or communicative," evidence as prohibited by
the fifth amendment. The Court further found that such taking was not so unreasonable an
intrusion into the suspect's privacy that it constituted a fourth amendment violation. Recog-
nizing that "[tihe values protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . substantially overlap
those the Fifth Amendments helps to protect" so that the "intimate relation" rationalp would
seem to apply, the Court nonetheless explicitly dismissed Boyd and Gouled as establishing
limitations on the kinds of property that may be seized under warrant and therefore of no
help in this case. 384 U.S. at 767-68.
24. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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tent to which an individual's privacy is compromised by seizure of
evidence, rather than the existence of superior property rights or
characterization of the property as mere evidence. Under Hayden,
the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment is satisfied,
and thus the evidence may be seized under warrant, when there is
a reasonable nexus between the item to be seized and the alleged
criminal behavior.25 The Court in Hayden explicitly limited the
scope of its decision to the fourth amendment protection of privacy
question, however, and cautioned that the opinion left undecided
the "intimate relation" question of "whether there are items of evi-
dential value whose very nature precludes them from being the
object of a reasonable search and seizure."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to
address the question left open in the Hayden caveat with its deci-
sion in United States v. Bennett.2 The court held that the fourth
amendment does not protect against searches for and seizures of
items whose compulsory production would be prohibited by the fifth
amendment. The application of fourth and fifth amendment protec-
tions involve different considerations; the fourth is concerned with
securing individual privacy by restricting the limit of searches to a
reasonable scope, whereas invocation of fifth amendment protection
requires a preliminary determination of the testimonial character of
the item or information to be seized.28 The Sixth Circuit subse-
25. The required nexus will automatically exist when the item to be seized is an instru-
mentality, contraband, or fruit of a crime, whereas a proposed seizure of "mere evidence"
requires a demonstration of sufficient connection between the crime itself and the object to
be seized to satisfy probable cause. The Supreme Court's repudiation of the mere evidence
rule has since assumed statutory dimension in 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(b).
26. 387 U.S. at 302-03. This caveat was stated in Hayden because the Court found that
as the clothing seized was not of a testimonial nature and there was no compulsion on the
suspect to bear witness against himself the fifth amendment problems did not arise.
27. 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969) & 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
28. The Bennett court maintained, on the basis of Hayden, that the "intimate relation"
dictum of Boyd had been largely repudiated and found that the fourth amendment's purpose
is not to protect evidence whose compulsory seizure would violate the fifth amendment. 409
F.2d at 896-97. Citing the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d
911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930), the Bennett court stated that the evil to be guarded against in search
and seizure cases is the unlimited search. The court emphasized that the letter seized in
Bennett and introduced as evidence of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws (21 U.S.C. § 173-
74 (1970)) was seized incident to a valid arrest and involved "no 'rummaging'" through
defendant's apartment. 409 F.2d at 897. Thus, the Bennett court has been interpreted as
holding that "no item is inherently unseizable, pursuant to a valid warrant or incident to a
lawful arrest, unless its seizure compromises the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights."
Shaffer v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Colo. 1974). See also United States v. Scharfman,
448 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1971), which follows Bennett on the fourth (a search must be more
than a "mere roving commission") and fifth amendment grounds.
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quently adopted the Bennett rationale by ruling in United States
v. Blank2 that the seizure of business records" pursuant to a valid
warrant does not violate the author's privilege against self-
incrimination. Finding that production of evidence under a valid
warrant is not a form of compulsion in the fifth amendment sense,3'
and that business records of which others have knowledge are not
testimonial or communicative of privately held thoughts, the Blank
court ruled that the author must rely on his right to privacy 2 for
protection against governmental intrusion. The Seventh Circuit,
however, reached an opposite result in Hill v. Philpott,33 holding
that if the introduction of the evidence seized would be prohibited
by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a
search for and seizure of that evidence would be unreasonable under
the fourth amendment through the "intimate relation" rationale.
Emphasizing that a search warrant is a form of compulsion for fifth
amendment purposes, 4 the Hill court stated that when the records
seized" are testimonial in nature," the privilege against self-
incrimination attaches and the seizure, although pursuant to a
search warrant, is unconstitutional under both amendments. 37 The
29. 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
30. The records seized under warrant in Blank were betting sheets from an alleged
horse-book gambling business.
31. The court accepted Wigmore's distinction between subpoenas and search warrants
for compulsion purposes, and quoted Hayden and Schmerber to support that view.
32. In so holding, the Blank court expressed the view that only those items intimately
connected with fourth amendment privacy rights could fall within the Hayden caveat classifi-
cation, being by nature precluded from reasonable searches and seizures. Following the rea-
soning of Bennett, the Blank court found that the fourth amendment protections of probable
cause, particularity, and a neutral magistrate sufficiently preserve privacy from unreasonable
intrusion. The Blank court further suggested, however, that the right to privacy extends
beyond the fourth amendment to the broader rights described in fifth amendment terms in
Hayden and Schmerber, and in fourteenth amendment terms in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). 459 F.2d at 386.
33. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
34. The Hill court reasoned that Gouled established that a search warrant is as much
a form of compulsion as a court order. (See Boyd v. United States, note, 15 supra and
accompanying text.) The court maintained that to dismiss the compulsory qualities of a
warrant "ignores the realities of trial." 445 F.2d at 149. See 46 TuL. L. REv. 545, 549-50 (1972);
see also 54 GEO L.J., supra note 18, at 598 n.29.
35. The facts of Hill closely parallel those of the instant case. In Hill, special agents of
the IRS Intelligence Division were granted search warrants on the basis of affidavits by former
employees of plaintiff which alleged existence of files evidencing tax evasion. The subsequent
search of plaintiff physician's home and office resulted in seizure of more than thirty cartons
of papers.
36. According to Hill, the first step in evaluating the constitutionality of a seizure of
private records is determining whether introduction of the evidence would violate the fifth
amendment by inquiring whether the evidence "relates to some communicative act or writ-
ing." 445 F.2d at 148.
37. The majority in Hill rejected the government's position that "once the validity of a
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dissenting opinion reasoned that the doctor's business records seized
in Hill were not of "a class of papers so intimately confidential and
so much a part of personhood"'' to deserve protection from seizure
on self-incrimination grounds and, alternatively, such records con-
stituted "instrumentalities" of a crime which have never been pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. The Ninth Circuit, presented with
a factual situation almost identical to Hill and the instant case,
recently held in VonderAhe v. Howland39 that the search and seizure
in question violated the fourth amendment due to overbreadth, °
but because no criminal prosecution was initiated, the petitioner's
fifth amendment self-incrimination claim must fail. One judge, con-
curring in part and citing Boyd, reasoned that use of a search war-
rant, coupled with the fact that the petitioner alone had made en-
tries in the records seized, constituted a compulsory taking of per-
sonal thoughts in violation of the fifth amendment.4' The separate
opinion also noted that such a search and seizure violated peti-
tioner's interest in a personal inner sanctum that is protected under
the fifth amendment42 from government intrusion. Thus, presented
search is established under the Fourth Amendment-and by that fact alone-the Fifth
Amendment is not and cannot be violated." Id. at 146.
38. Id. at 150.
39. 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974) (dentist's records seized by IRS).
40. The VonderAhe court found that while there was probable cause for issuance of the
warrant in question, the agents were guilty of exceeding the limits of the general warrant by
seizing all the plaintiff's records and private papers.
41. The VonderAhe court employed slightly different reasoning than Hill in assessing
the compulsion factor inherent in a search warrant. The former court reasoned that the
"imminence of such force" resulting from refusal to submit to a warrant administration
constituted sufficient compulsion for fifth amendment purposes. 508 F.2d at 373. In asserting
the testimonial nature of the seized records, the VonderAhe court further found that the
search in that case went beyond a search for "real or physical" evidence to a quest for writings
that would bespeak the author's guilt. Id. at 377.
42. The concurrence relied on Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), and cases
cited therein as authority for the existence of a right to a "sanctum of individual feeling and
thought" which the government cannot invade to extract self-condemnation. 508 F.2d at 377.
The dissents by Justices Douglas and Marshall in Couch agreed that the fourth and fifth
amendments together delineate a sphere of privacy to be protected absolutely from govern-
mental intrusion. Marshall suggested criteria for determining whether the evidence sought
lies within an individual's sphere of privacy, including consideration of the nature of the items
to be seized and the steps taken by the author to insure privacy of the items. Marshall further
rejected the alternative view to the intimate relation rationale, which maintains:
unless a Fifth Amendment privilege is involved, the Fourth Amendment authorizes
intrusion where it is not unreasonable. However, this Court has held that increasingly
severe standards of probable cause are necessary to justify increasingly intensive
searches. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The precise elements
required of a Fifth Amendment violation need not coincide exactly with the elements of
an invasion of privacy that should be considered unreasonable, and I see no reason to
confine the sphere of privacy free from intrusion to just what the Fifth Amendment
protects.
409 U.S. at 349-50, n.6 (other citations omitted).
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with nearly identical fact situations in the context of a question left
open by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts have employed var-
ious reasoning processes and have arrived at antithetical results in
deciding whether the fifth amendment places any restrictions on the
kinds of evidence that reasonably may be seized under the fourth
amendment.
Ill. THE INSTANT OPINION
In determining whether the challenged search violated plain-
tiffs fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the in-
stant court first confronted the split of authority among other cir-
cuits presented by the Bennett, Blank, Hill, and VonderAhe deci-
sions. The instant court chose not to follow the factually similar 3
Hill and VonderAhe decisions that found violations of the self-
incrimination privilege and adopted the view that seizure pursuant
to a valid search warrant does not involve compulsion in the fifth
amendment sense.44 The court further asserted that the fifth amend-
ment was not violated by the search in question because the records
seized were business records of which others must have had knowl-
edge, implying that such records could not be considered communi-
cative of privately held thoughts. The court, reasoning from a policy
viewpoint, stated that to disallow information properly obtained in
a nonaccusatorial setting pursuant to a valid search and seizure
would diminish the value of the search warrant as "one of the most
effective tools in the enforcement of the criminal justice system."45
Having found no fifth amendment objections to the seizure in ques-
tion, the court cited Bennett46 in rejecting the "intimate relation"
rationale that the fourth amendment protects against searches and
seizures of items whose compulsory production would be forbidden
by the fifth amendment. The court concluded that the lack of com-
pulsion incident to a search warrant and the fact that the items
43. According to the district court's opinion in the instant case, the government admit-
ted in its pleadings that Hill and VonderAhe were "factually indistinguishable" from the
instant case. 383 F. Supp. at 561.
44. The Tenth Circuit avoided premising its noncompulsion contention on Wigmore's
authority but relied on the following cases from other circuits finding lack of coercion attend-
ant to searches under warrant: United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 956 (1973); United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
45. Shaffer v. Wilson, No. 74-1671 at 7 (10th Cir., May 23, 1975).
46. The court also pointed out that United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972), reiterated the Bennett rule that there is no violation
of one's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by reason of the proper execu-
tion of a valid search and seizure.
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seized were business records of which others must have had knowl-
edge combined to defeat the plaintiff's fifth amendment claims.
Further, the court found that without a fifth amendment basis the
"intimate relation" rationale could not operate to establish a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment through the fifth.
The court next considered the plaintiff's fourth amendment
claims that the warrant was invalid for overbreadth and that the
execution by the IRS agents was defective because they seized per-
sonal records not authorized by the warrant. Addressing the over-
breadth issue, the court found that the warrant contained a descrip-
tion of items to be seized sufficient to meet the particularity require-
ment of the fourth amendment. The court also found sufficient
probable cause because the warrant was issued "largely upon" the
supporting affidavits of three of plaintiff's former employees.,'
In finding sufficient probable cause, the court emphasized that
the records seized possessed the requisite nexus under Hayden."
The court additionally concluded that since the records seized were
business rather than private records, "not so much a part of person-
hood that they ought to enjoy a superlative privacy,"49 the formal
warrant requirements provided sufficient protection of plaintiff's
privacy interests under the fourth amendment. Ruling that the in-
stant seizure was not in violation of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and that the search warrant was properly
issued and executed, the court found the search and seizure of
plaintiff's business records to be constitutionally permissible.
Writing in dissent, Judge Seth initially argued that searches
and seizures of business records for evidence of tax evasion are un-
reasonable because they amount to a general search in violation of
the fourth amendment." Noting the shift in the Supreme Court's
47. See note 4 supra.
48. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. The instant court failed to make clear
whether the requisite nexus was established on a demonstration of probable cause or whether
the records were found to satisfy the nexus requirement because of their characterization as
instrumentalities, a rationale suggested by the instant court's citation to Bennett (letter could
be seized to determine whether it was an instrumentality for effecting a conspiracy) and
Scharfman ("it is entirely reasonable to assume that the materials were used as instrumental-
ities in connection with the crime of disposing of stolen fur garments"). No. 74-1671 at 5.
49. Quoting Judge Fairchild's dissent in Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 150 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 991 (1971).
50. A search under these circumstances has to be unreasonable. For all practical
purposes the scope of both the search and of the seizure had to be determined on the
ground by the agents making the search to try to meet the nexus standard and to
attempt to make a case. This situation cannot be in conformity with the fourth
amendment. This is more than a defect or complaint as to the wording of the warrant;




concern from protection of a category of papers to protection of an
individual's privacy, the dissent reasoned that the nexus require-
ment and the Hayden caveat were directed toward protection of the
privacy interest. The dissent stated that, since searches for evidence
of tax evasion are of a general nature, necessitating rummaging
through all the taxpayer's records, the requirement of showing a
nexus between the particular item to be seized and the alleged
criminal activity prior to obtaining a warrant could not be met. The
judge further observed that on the authority of such general war-
rants the IRS field agents are free to determine during the course
of the search which items possessed the requisite nexus to justify
their seizure, thus emphasizing that the lack of nexus prior to the
search helped create an unjustifiably broad execution. The dissent
argued that plaintiff's fourth amendment right to privacy protecting
personal papers is a right to be free from searches of those papers,
not merely a guarantee that before trial personal papers will be
separated from seized items that will be offered as evidence. Accord-
ingly, the dissent labelled in-the-field probable cause determina-
tions unreasonable.5 1 Having found that both the issuance and the
execution of the warrant in the instant case violated the fourth
amendment requirements of particularity and probable cause, the
dissent further asserted that such a search could be unreasonable
even assuming its conduct under a valid warrant. The dissent main-
tained that a search under warrant of private records5 2 constituted
a compulsory production of self-incriminatory evidence in violation
of the fifth amendment, " and therefore was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment through the "intimate relation" rationale. Con-
tending that the majority's rejection of the "intimate relation" ra-
tionale amounted to a denial of any connection between the two
No. 74-1671 at 6.
51. Wle cannot help but wonder where the "privacy" is after such a process
.... There must be a "privacy" which surrounds the search itself. The Fourth Amend-
ment contemplates some protection from a search as an important right. This is just as
much a matter of privacy as the document-sorting procedure seeks to protect and per-
haps more important. . . .It is the search-the entry which is the invasion of personal
rights. The forcible entry by strangers is what impinges on: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."
Id. at 8-9 of dissent.
52. The dissent rejected the majority's contention that the records seized were not
private by asserting that the right of privacy from governmental intrusion which attaches to
records is not eliminated by the mere fact that employees participated in recording those
papers. Id. at 9 of dissent.
53. Judge Seth criticized the majority's noncompulsion position, characterizing the
distinction between production by subpoena and production by warrant as a "typical distinc-
tion without a difference." Id. at 11.
[Vol. 281370
RECENT CASES
amendments, the dissent claimed that the amendments' joint con-
cern with the right of privacy indicates an interconnection so inti-
mate that fourth amendment searches must be limited to those
items whose production could be compelled under the fifth amend-
ment.
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision, relying on one side of conflicting preced-
ent from other circuits, does little to reconcile the divergent answers
to the issue raised by the Hayden caveat: what limits, if any, on
searches and seizures should be developed to replace the discredited
categorizations of the mere evidence rule. The Bennett decision,
considering whether an item that possessed the requisite character-
istics for protection under the privilege against self-incrimination
consequently was proscribed as an object of a reasonable search and
seizure, began a series of opinions obscuring the focus of this issue
by failing to recognize that the amendments jointly protect overlap-
ping substantive values through procedurally distinct mechanisms.
In the instant case the dissent comes closest to recognizing the dual
nature of the relationship between the amendments by looking be-
yond the question of whether an item's seizure meets the procedural
prerequisites for protection under the fourth or fifth amendment
and, instead, concentrating on the broader concern shared by the
amendments-protection of an individual's privacy from govern-
mental intrusion. Although the amendments' procedural prerequis-
ites provide tools for examining the constitutional permissibility of
a given seizure or compelled production, reliance on such tools as
the threshold criteria for determination of a privacy-invasion claim
exalts the mechanisms over the substantive right of privacy those
mechanisms were designed to protect." The better approach is to
recognize that the amendments jointly create a right in the individ-
54. The constitutional stature of a right of privacy has found acceptance by the Su-
preme Court, beginning with the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The Court further has explicitly based fourth and fifth amendment decisions striking
down compelled testimony and unreasonable searches on concern for protection of the right
of privacy. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 573 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). As recently as 1974, the Supreme Court has emphasized:
* . . the protection of an individual's right to a "private enclave where he may lead a
private life."
We have recognized that the Fifth Amendment "respects a private inner sanctum
of individual feeling and thought"-an inner sanctum which necessarily includes an
individual's papers and effects to the extent that the privilege bars their compulsory
production and authentication-and "proscribes state intrusion to extract self-
condemnation."
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (citations omitted).
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ual to be free from governmental intrusion. In cases concerning
searches for and seizures of business records, this right protects
certain items within a zone of personal privacy."
Determining the validity of a search and seizure on the basis
of a zone of privacy analysis is preferable for several reasons. First,
the analysis is consistent with the Boyd and Gouled precedent as it
establishes limits on searches conducted under a valid warrant after
the fourth and fifth amendment requirements have been met, and
further suggests a conceptual approach for determining those limits.
Secondly, a zone of privacy analysis more accurately emphasizes the
indication in Boyd, Gouled, and Hayden that there are limits on
searches created by the intimate relationship of the fourth and fifth
amendments. Such an approach achieves that emphasis while
avoiding hypertechnical discussions concerning formal prerequisites
for protection under the separate amendments (probable cause, par-
ticularity, compulsion, communicative evidence) that previously
have obstructed judicial analysis. Thirdly, employing a zone of pri-
vacy approach abrogates the need to develop artificial constructs of
such formal requirements as "compulsion" which have become
technical impediments to the exercise of the privacy right. Finally,
the establishment of a zone of privacy protected from governmental
intrusion should end the practice of seizing immune personal items,
sorting through those items, and subsequently returning them with-
out introduction into evidence after privacy already has been de-
stroyed by the search itself. Although the zone of privacy concept,
best oriented to the common concern of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, should be used as the new limit on allowable searches and
seizures, the obvious problem is delimiting the proper boundaries of
that zone. A rational definition of the zone and the items protected
thereby is no more difficult to construct,"5 however, than are the
present efforts that attempt to manipulate divergent procedural
requirements. Additionally, a zone of privacy analysis is more logi-
55. In their dissenting opinions in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), Justices
Douglas and Marshall reiterate their analysis that the relationship between the fourth and
fifth amendments creates a zone or sphere of privacy that those amendments jointly protect
from governmental intrusion. 409 U.S. at 338, 344. One commentator suggests that the major-
ity decision accepts that same theory when it points out the interdependence of the two
amendments. Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment Considerations, 6 LoYoLA L.A.L. REv. 274, 293 (1973).
56. In this context, the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967), proposing a two-tiered test to determine the applicability of fourth
amendment privacy protection, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 344 (1973), suggesting criteria for determining if an item is to
be considered within an individual's sphere of privacy for fourth and fifth amendment pur-
poses, are instructive as to implementation of the "intimate relation" privacy protection.
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cally connected with the proscriptions developed in Boyd and
Gouled.
Because it is questionable whether records of transactions that
would be used to establish tax evasion could be considered private
documents, or even within a protected zone, the status of private
business records vis-a-vis valid search warrants accentuates the
need for a definitive statement by the Supreme Court. The dissent
suggests two ways in which the issue could be resolved to effect
greater protection for business records. The first method is adoption
of the zone of privacy rationale and delineation of guidelines for
determining the extent of that zone. A second approach is to seek
protection of records at the threshold level of warrant issuance,
rather than to attempt to restrict the limits of the search permissi-
ble under a valid warrant by relying on a zone of privacy. To prevent
a general search and seizure of all the accused's records, the instant
dissent recommends that IRS searches be placed in a category of
their own, requiring a different probable cause showing prior to
issuance of a warrant. 51 Since IRS searches by nature tend to require
exploration of all the records of a suspect, the post-Hayden practice
of sorting the documents after seizure comes too late to protect the
privacy interests. A stronger showing of the reasons for the search,
coupled with a detailed listing of records to be searched as well as
those to be seized, would be the only effective check on the discre-
tion of a field agent and a better assurance of privacy for records
unrelated to the evidence sought. Additionally, requiring a stricter
probable cause burden when papers are sought provides the court
with an alternative to placing papers of all degrees of privacy expec-
tation into a protected zone; a sliding scale of probable cause also
will protect legitimate government discovery interests. The instant
decision simply adds to the division among the circuits without
resolving the question of what limits should be applied to searches
under warrant. The dissenting opinion, however, suggests an ap-
proach that may provide a workable alternative to the present anal-
ysis and insure the continued protection of privacy-the primary
concern of the fourth and fifth amendments.
MITCHELL M. PURVIS
57. No. 74-1671 at 7. Such a "sliding scale" of probable cause has been suggested by
the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and adopted by lower
courts. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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Labor Law-Bankruptcy-Collective Bargaining
Agreement May Be Rejected in Chapter XI
Proceeding if Debtor-in-Possession Can Show
Agreement to Be Onerous and Burdensome
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
REA Express, Inc., a debtor-in-possession under Chapter XI of
the Bankruptcy Act,' moved for an order2 permitting rejection of its
collective bargaining agreements with two unions,' contending that
the agreements were voidable under section 313(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act4 as onerous and burdensome executory contracts. The
unions argued that the Railway Labor Act [RLA] prohibits such
rejection of collective bargaining agreements except in the manner
prescribed in that Act,5 and asserted that the debtor-in-possession
1. REA Express, Inc. [hereinafter REA] and several affiliated companies filed peti-
tions under Chapter XI, § 322 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 et seq. (1970), on
February 18, 1975. REA was authorized under § 343 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 743
(1970), to operate its business under court supervision as a debtor-in-possession.
2. REA moved pursuant to § 313(1), 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970), and Rule 11-53 of the
Bankruptcy Rules, for an order permitting rejection of the agreements. While accepting the
evidence of REA's precarious financial situation, the bankruptcy judge denied authority to
reject the agreement, holding that a bankruptcy court is without authority to permit the
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. The judge determined that "this is not the kind
of Chapter XI." Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 at 167
(2d Cir. 1975). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1970), REA appealed this decision to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which reversed.
3. REA is a party to separate collective bargaining agreements with the Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks (BRAC) and the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). These agreements, which are subject to the provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter RLA], substan-
tially affect REA's right to close or consolidate facilities and transfer or lay off workers, and
require supplementary unemployment benefits to workers who have been laid off. In bank-
ruptcy court, REA presented evidence that it had incurred substantial liabilities as debtor-
in-possession, had an outstanding payroll liability of over $4 million, and was unable to meet
either its current expenses or the full wage scales mandated by the collective bargaining
agreements. It further contended that the bargaining agreements would prevent implementa-
tion of a reorganization plan that would enable the company to survive.
4. Section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970), provides:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and
duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter-
(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the parties
to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may designate ....
5. Section 2 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970), provides, in pertinent part, that "no
carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its
employees, as a class" without undergoing the protracted procedures prescribed by § 6 of the
RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970). The unions emphasized that a "carrier" as defined in § 1 of
the RLA, includes "any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body. . .when in possession
of the business of any such 'carrier' . . . " 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The unions contended
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was obligated as a successor-employer to assume the existing labor
contracts. Finding the agreements burdensome and concluding that
there was no limitation on the type of executory contracts that a
debtor-in-possession could reject under section 313(1),' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered judgment for REA Express. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, remanded.7 Although
a debtor-in-possession is obligated as a successor-employer to nego-
tiate with its employees' bargaining representative, it may under
section 313(1) reject its predecessor's onerous and burdensome
collective bargaining agreement when it has neither expressly as-
sumed the agreement nor conformed to its terms without disaffirm-
ance. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d
164 (2d Cir. 1975).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Federal bankruptcy law authorizes the court under section
313(1) to relieve a debtor-in-possession from the burdens of an exe-
cutory contract entered into by its predecessor. Ordinarily, the sec-
tion 313(1) power is exercised when rejection of an executory con-
tract will benefit the estate and preserve solvency.8 When the execu-
tory contract to be rejected is a collective bargaining agreement,
however, there is a strong conflict between the Bankruptcy Act
policy giving the debtor a new start and the labor laws policy en-
couraging enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Because
section 313(1) fails to describe the circumstances warranting rejec-
tion of an executory contract and makes no distinction among
classes of executory contracts that may be rejected, the determina-
tion of whether collective bargaining agreements are voidable under
section 313(1) becomes a task of judicial interpretation.
The initial decision addressing the issue was In re Klaber Bros.,
Inc.,' in which a federal district court held that collective bargaining
that the debtor-in-possession, as a carrier, was obligated to utilize the statutory notice,
conference, and mediation procedures required by the Act before it made any change in its
collective bargaining agreements.
6. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 11, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479,
494 (1974); Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 477 (1969).
7. The court remanded the case for a determination whether the bargaining agreements
in question were sufficiently onerous and burdensome to warrant rejection. The court found
that the record failed to indicate clearly: (1) the extent to which each agreement would
preclude continued operation of REA; (2) the extent to which the district court balanced the
competing interests of the debtor-in-possession and the employees who would be affected by
such a rejection. REA subsequently was adjudicated bankrupt November 6, 1975.
8. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRuprcy 3.15[8] (14th ed. rev. 1975).
9. 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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agreements subject to the National Labor Relations Act"0 [NLRA]
are within the class of executory contracts which may be rejected
in Chapter XI proceedings. Balancing the disadvantages to the
debtor of keeping the contract in force against the potential liabili-
ties created by its rejection, the Klaber court determined that rejec-
tion of an executory contract should be authorized when rejection
will benefit the estate." Subsequently, in In re Overseas Nat'l Air-
ways, Inc.," a district court held that collective bargaining agree-
ments subject to the RLA are never within the class of executory
contracts that may be rejected in Chapter XI proceedings. The
court distinguished Klaber, which permitted the rejection of an
NLRA agreement, noting that the airline employees affected were
covered by section 2 of the RLA. That section expressly forbids a
carrier from unilaterally altering the existing rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions of its employees without undergoing the pro-
tracted procedures prescribed in section 6 of the RLA.'3 The court
acknowledged that agreements covered by the NLRA were voidable
under section 313(1), but stressed that rejection or modification of
RLA contracts could be effected only through the specified statutory
procedures. The Supreme Court apparently strengthened the posi-
tion of the Overseas court by its decision in Detroit & T.S.L.R.R.
v. United Transp. Union," holding that the purpose of section 2 of
the RLA is to give legal and binding effect to collective bargaining
agreements and to require that they be changed only in accordance
with statutory procedures.
Subsequently, in Shopmen Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods.,
Inc. ,5 the Second Circuit became the first federal court of appeals
10. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
11. 173 F. Supp. at 85. See Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968) (NLRA bargaining agreement held voidable in straight bank-
ruptcy proceeding).
12. 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
13. The procedures embodied in § 6 require 30 days written notice of intended changes
in terms of employment and submission of disputes to the National Mediation Board, should
either party so request. Section 6 also specifies that the carrier may not alter rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions, pending exhaustion of these procedures. The purpose of § 6 is
to stabilize labor relations by extending agreements for a limited period regardless of the
parties' intentions. Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 817 (1964).
14. 396 U.S. 142, 156 (1969).
15. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). Kevin Steel Products, Inc., a debtor-in-possession under
Chapter XI, appealed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, which held that the power of a bankruptcy court to relieve a debtor from the
burdens of executory contracts does not apply to collective bargaining agreements. Shopmen
Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Kevin Steel sought
to disaffirm its collective bargaining agreements, governed by the NLRA, with the Iron
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to confirm the power of a bankruptcy court under section 313(1) to
reject "onerous and burdensome" collective bargaining agreements
subject to the NLRA. 6 The court suggested, however, that the stan-
dard for determining the voidability of a bargaining agreement
should not be based (as the Klaber court proposed) solely on a
determination that such rejection will improve the financial status
of the debtor." Rather, the court emphasized that a bankruptcy
court should permit rejection only after balancing the benefits and
burdens of rejection to both the debtor and its employees.18 The
court then rejected the unions' contention that collective bargaining
agreements were excluded from the class of executory contracts
voidable under the Bankruptcy Act, reasoning that had Congress
desired such an exclusion, it would have so provided.19 Finally, the
court suggested in dictum that even when a court authorizes the
rejection of a bargaining agreement, the 1972 Supreme Court deci-
sion in NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc.21 may require the
debtor-in-possession to bargain with the incumbent employees' des-
ignated representative.2 Burns held that a successor-employer will
Workers. There was no effort to reject additional contracts with other unions representing the
company's outside iron workers and truck drivers.
16. The case was remanded, however, to determine whether the agreement in question
was sufficiently onerous to warrant rejection.
17. 519 F.2d at 707.
18. Id., citing In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238F. Supp. 359,361 (E.D.N.Y. 1965);
cf. Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 477, 481 (1969). See
also In re Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
19. The court found the absence of such exclusionary language particularly significant
in light of § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970), which specifically
prohibits bankruptcy courts from interfering with collective bargaining agreements affecting
"railroad employees." Section 77(n) provides in part:
No judge or trustee acting under this [Act] shall change the wages or working conditions
of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in [the RLA] ....
The court also rejected the claim of the unions and the NLRB that § 8(d) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), prohibits rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. Although §
8(d) expressly imposes upon a "party" certain notice and mediation procedures before a labor
contract may be terminated or modified, the Kevin Steel court found that a debtor-in-
possession is not a "party" under § 8(d) to any labor agreement with the union and thus will
not be subject to the § 8(d) termination restrictions unless and until it assumes the old
agreement or enters into a new one.
20. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
21. Although Bums Security Services was not bound by the substantive provisions of
the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, the Court suggested in dictum that when
the successor-employer is a party in a reorgnization proceeding, the party may be held to have
assumed the predecessor's agreement. In support of its proposition, the Court cited Oilfield
Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963), in which the respondent construction company
was held to be the "alter ego" of its predecessor and was thus required to maintain the
predecessor's contracts because: (1) both companies were owned and controlled by the same
persons; (2) the business of the predecessor was carried on without a break by the successor;
(3) both companies employed the same supervisory personnel; (4) nearly all of the predeces-
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be bound by its predecessor's duty to bargain collectively when the
appropriate bargaining unit is identical both before and after the
change in employers and when the successor has hired a substantial
percentage of its predecessor's employees.12 Since the court in Kevin
Steel merely suggested, without elaboration, that the obligations of
a debtor-in-possession are "analogous" to those of a successor-
employer under Burns, the decision left unclear the extent to which
a debtor-in-possession may free itself from its predecessor's duty to
bargain. Moreover, although Kevin Steel established the voidability
of collective bargaining agreements subject to the NLRA, the law
regarding agreements under the RLA was less clear because of the
earlier decisions in Overseas Nat'l Airways and United
Transportation.
II. THE INSTANT OPINION
Recognizing at the outset that federal labor policy strongly fa-
vors the specific performance of collective bargaining agreements,
the instant court nevertheless held that in the absence of a clear
congressional mandate to the contrary,2s federal labor law must
yield to the bankruptcy court's power to relieve debtors of onerous
and burdensome executory contracts. The court reasoned that nei-
ther the RLA nor the Bankruptcy Act contained language excluding
collective bargaining agreements from the operation of section
313(1). Had Congress desired such an exclusion, the court observed,
it would have so provided.
The court next dismissed the unions' contention that the plain
language of the RLA prohibits rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement except in the manner prescribed by that Act. Although
noting that the RLA expressly obligates an employer to undergo
sor's employees accepted employment with the new company. It is unclear whether this
rationale would be applicable to debtors-in-possession under Chapter XI.
22. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). The successor-employer may also assume an obligation to
bargain when it: (1) fails to hire a majority of the predecessor's work force for anti-union
reasons; or (2) plans to retain all of the predecessor's employees. In the first case in which it
considered the obligations of successor-employers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543 (1964), the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances a successor-employer
may be bound by the duty to arbitrate imposed by its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 550-51. Nash, Successorship in Light of Burns, 7 GA. L. REv. 664, 671 (1973);
see Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARv. L. Ray. 759 (1975).
23. The instant court cited § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 19, as an example
of the ability of Congress to exclude certain executory contracts from the operation of the
Bankruptcy Act. See In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)
(applying § 77(n) to a collective bargaining agreement between an airline and its steward-
esses). See also NLRA § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 165 (1970) (overriding Bankruptcy Act § 272, 11
U.S.C. § 672 (1970)).
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protracted procedures24 before implementing changes in a collective
bargaining agreement, the instant court determined that the
debtor-in-possession is a new "juridical entity"25 which is not bound
to follow the procedures of section 6 of the RLA unless it assumes
the agreement either expressly or by conforming to its terms without
disaffirmance. 21 Accordingly, the court held that section 6 neither
binds REA as a debtor-in-possession, nor prevents the bankruptcy
court from rejecting the collective bargaining agreement under sec-
tion 313(1). The court then established a new test for determining
the voidability of RLA agreements under section 313(1). In view of
the "serious effects" that rejection of a bargaining agreement has on
the debtor's employees, the court held that rejection "should be
authorized only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils
and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will collapse
and the employees will no longer have their jobs. '2 The case was
remanded for a determination, under this test, of whether the agree-
ment was sufficiently onerous and burdensome to warrant rejection.
Finally, the court stressed that the Bankruptcy Act does not
authorize a debtor-in-possession to ignore its obligations under the
labor laws. Recalling Burns,2s the instant court noted that even
where the debtor-in-possession is permitted to reject the burdensone
collective bargaining agreement of its predecessor, it may neverthe-
less be obligated under Burns to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentative of the employees it hires.29 Under the facts presented in
the instant case, the court held that REA, as a successor-employer,
was obligated to negotiate with its employees' bargaining represent-
ative.
IV. COMMENT
In holding that the Bankruptcy Act overrides provisions of the
RLA expressly requiring the exhaustion of statutory procedures be-
fore changing terms of employment, the instant decision, in con-
junction with the decision in Kevin Steel, firmly establishes the
24. See note 13 supra.
25. 523 F.2d 164 at 170; see In re Capital Serv., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
26. See generally In re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (by retaining the
predecessor's employees without changing their terms of employment, the bankruptcy trus-
tees assumed the collective bargaining agreement and could not subsequently reject it);
Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 635 (1940) (receiver implicitly
adopted debtor's labor contract).
27. 523 F.2d 164 at 172.
28. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
29. See Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1971).
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power of a bankruptcy court to void burdensome collective bargain-
ing agreements in Chapter XI proceedings. The extent to which the
Bankruptcy Act actually displaces federal labor law, however, re-
mains unclear. Although the instant court argued that the RLA
must yield to the broader powers of the Bankruptcy Act, the deci-
sion nevertheless appears to implement indirectly the RLA termina-
tion policies by requiring that the debtor-in-possession under a
collective bargaining agreement meet a more substantial burden of
proof for voiding an executory contract under section 313(1) than
the burden imposed upon parties to non-labor contracts. Whereas
a debtor-in-possession seeking to reject a non-labor executory con-
tract need prove only that rejection will benefit the estate and pre-
serve solvency,"0 a debtor-in-possession petitioning for rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement further must establish that unless
the agreement is rejected, the business will collapse and the employ-
ees will no longer have jobs. The court thus appears to be adopting
an interpretation of section 313(1) that would allow the rejection of
an RLA agreement only when the retention of the contract would
prevent survival of the carrier.
Requiring this heavier burden in establishing the onerousness
of a collective bargaining agreement appears to be desirable for
several reasons. First, a stricter standard will give the fullest effect
to the intention of Congress in federal labor -legislation to avoid
disruption of commerce by requiring the parties to exhaust statu-
tory procedures before initiating unilateral actions. Secondly, the
test proposed by the instant court more effectively will protect em-
ployee expectations by insuring that the bargaining agreements will
be rejected in only the most extraordinary circumstances. Thus,
under this test, it will be less likely that employees will lose benefits
secured through collective action. Finally, allowing the debtor-in-
possession to reject an otherwise disabling collective bargaining
agreement will help enable the business to survive, keeping at least
some of the employees at work and providing creditors greater assur-
ance that the debtor's obligations will be honored.
Although the test developed in the instant opinion may imple-
ment indirectly the policies of the RLA, it nevertheless conflicts
with both the express provisions of the RLA and with the Supreme
Court interpretation of that act in United Transportation.3 It there-
fore is incumbent upon Congress to provide some guidance in either
the RLA or the Bankruptcy Act concerning resolution of the conflict
30. See 8 COLLM ON BANKRuprcy 3.15[8] (14th ed. rev. 1975).
31. 396 U.S. 142, 156 (1969).
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between these two bodies of law. Secondly, the instant decision does
not make clear under which circumstances and at what point in
time a debtor-in-possession's duty to bargain with the union arises.
Under Burns, a successor-employer assumes an obligation to bar-
gain with the representative of his predecessor's employees if the
employees constitute a majority of its work force in an appropriate
bargaining unit. The instant court appears to have adopted the
Burns standard in holding, without explanation, that REA "as a
new employer" is obligated to bargain collectively with its employ-
ees.32 In merely requiring the debtor-in-possession to bargain with
the incumbent employees, however, the instant decision fails to
reach an adequate compromise between the competing interests of
employers and employees in Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings.
The court recognized that alternatives exclusively favoring either
labor or management interests were not acceptable. Imposing the
predecessor's burdensome contractual obligations on the debtor-in-
possession, for example, could restrict management prerogative and
thwart efforts to save a failing business from bankruptcy. On the
other hand, failure to bind the debtor-in-possession to the collective
bargaining obligation of its predecessor could deprive employees of
benefits gained through collective action. The instant court at-
tempted to resolve the tension between these interests by permitting
rejection of the entire agreement only after a substantial showing
that continued operations would lead to collapse of the business.
The court then would require a debtor-in-possession to bargain with
the incumbent employees. A better approach would be to permit
rejection of only those portions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment that the court finds onerous and burdensome, while leaving
in force the remaining portions of the agreement upon which the
employees have relied. Such an analysis would afford employees
greater protection than merely imposing an obligation to bargain,
while simultaneously allowing the debtor-in-possession to renego-
tiate the burdensome provisions of the old agreement.
GEORGE M. KRYDER, III
32. 523 F.2d 164 at 171.
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Federal Securities Acts Depends Upon the
Nationality and Residence of the Purchaser and
the Extent of Activity in the United States.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, a resident United States citizen, brought a class ac-
tion' on behalf of all American and foreign subscribers to the inter-
national securities offering of I.O.S., Ltd.,2 contending that the cor-
poration,3 its international accounting firm, 4 and its international
underwriters were subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Plaintiff
1. The complaint was brought as a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The court
estimated the class of purchasers to be 50,000, preponderantly citizens and residents of
Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and many other countries in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. The American purchasers, including the plaintiff,
were estimated at 386, most of whom lived abroad.
2. I.O.S., Ltd., an international sales and financial service organization principally
engaged in the sale and management of mutual funds and complementary financial activities,
is organized under the laws of Canada, with its main business office in Geneva, Switzerland,
and currently is being liquidated under Canadian law. The instant offering consisted of three
separate distributions of I.O.S. common stock. The primary distribution of 5,600,000 shares,
underwritten by six of the defendants, was sold to foreign investors outside of the United
States. The secondary offering of 1,450,000 shares was underwritten by another defendant, a
Canadian investment house, and distributed in Canada, solely to Canadian purchasers. A
third offering of 3,950,000 shares, underwritten by a Bahamian subsidiary of I.O.S., was
offered to employees, clients, and associates of I.O.S. The American investors involved pur-
chased in this last offering, even though none of the stock was listed or offered on American
exchanges. Plaintiff purchased 600 shares. All offerings involved substantially the same pro-
spectus, and offered the shares at the same price, $10 per share. The offerings were successful
in the limited sense of being fully subscribed, but after stabilizing briefly at $14, the price
per share drifted downward, and, in April of 1970, collapsed through the $10 level; three weeks
later the shares were virtually unsaleable.
3. Plaintiff joined both I.O.S., Ltd. and its organizer, Bernard Cornfeld.
4. One international accounting firm, having its principal office in the United States,
prepared the balance sheets and income statements that were included in all three prospec-
tuses.
5. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970), provides in pertinent
part:
77v. Jurisdiction of offenses and suits.-(a) The district courts of the United States,
• . . shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under
the rules and regulaions promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concur-
rent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter.
6. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act], 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), provides in pertinent part:
78aa. Jurisdiction of offenses and suits.-The district courts of the United States, ..
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cited extensive activities within the United States, 7 sales of securi-
ties to Americans," and adverse general effects on domestic securi-
ties markets' as bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Defen-
dants argued, however, that the offering was three distinct transac-
tions10 and, that when considered separately, not one had sufficient
nexus with the United States to warrant application of its securities
laws." The district court overruled a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 On interlocutory appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 3
When resident American investors subscribe to a foreign offering of
securities, the securities laws of the United States are applicable;
when American investors, resident abroad, subscribe to a foreign
offering, the securities laws apply if, and only if, acts within the
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
In addition to his charges under the securities laws, plaintiff alleged common law fraud.
7. The lower court found, in part, that representatives of the defendants had met in
New York on numerous occasions to initiate, organize, and structure the offering; that a New
York law firm and a New York accounting firm were retained in connection with the offerings;
that parts of the prospectus were drafted in New York; that proceeds from the underwriting
were deposited in accounts in a New York bank; and that extensive use was made of telephone
communication between New York and Switzerland.
8. Although most of the American purchasers, estimated at 386, lived abroad, sales
aggregating 41,936 shares were made to 22 American residents, all having relationships with
I.O.S. or its affiliates as employees, lawyers, directors, or consultants.
9. An affidavit by Morris Mendelson, Associate Professor of Finance at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, stated that the collapse of the I.O.S. offering (1)
deteriorated investor confidence in American underwriters, at home and abroad, (2) contrib-
uted to a steep decline in the purchase of United States securities by foreigners and the large
redemption of mutual fund shares, and (3) contributed to the breakdown of the American
securities markets' offshore investing industry. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,
987-88 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. Defendants pointed out that: (1) while the primary offering may have involved
certain activity in the United States, it sold no stock to American investors; (2) the second
offering involved neither United States activities nor sales to American investors; and (3)
while the third offering included sales to Americans, it involved no activities in the United
States.
12. The district court also found no in personam jurisdiction over one of the defendants,
the Canadian underwriters of the secondary offering. The district court attached a Rule 54(b)
certificate to the dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction, and certified its holding on
subject matter jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
13. As to the district court's holding of no in personam jurisdiction over one of the
defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Furthermore, the court refused to recognize pen-
dent jurisdiction over the foreign members of the class on the basis of the common law fraud
charge. Considering the size of the class and the potential confusion in applying both statu-
tory and common law provisions, the court held it would be a breach of discretion to retain
the foreign plaintiffs in the class.
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United States significantly contributed to the alleged fraud; and,
when foreign investors subscribe to a foreign offering, the securities
laws apply if, and only if, acts within the United States directly
caused the alleged fraud. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Bersch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., Civil No. 75-596 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1975).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 193314 and section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193415 grant federal courts broad
subject matter jurisdiction to hear suits for violation of the acts'
anti-fraud provisions. Neither act, however, defines the proper ap-
plication of the anti-fraud provisions to the transnational purchase
and sale of securities. 6 Further, although the Securities Exchange
Commission has exempted certain foreign offerings from the regis-
tration provisions of the acts,1 7 it has not promulgated a rule govern-
ing the extraterritorial scope of the anti-fraud provisions. Rather,
the proper scope of subject matter jurisdiction in international se-
curities transactions has been left to judicial determination. Kook
v. Crang,5 the first case to consider the issue, sought guidance in
section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, which excludes from the provisions of
the Act any person who "transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States." 9 Construing that provision,
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. Section 10(b), the anti-fraud provision of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78(j)(b) (1970),
does provide its own jurisdictional standards:
78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-. . . (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
The instant decision deals, however, with the issue of whether the securities acts are at all
applicable-a threshhold consideration before the more precise requirements of section 10(b)
can even be reached.
17. SEC Securities Act Releases Nos. 33-4708, 34-7366 (July 9, 1964). But see SEC Rule
17a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-7 (1975)(registration requirements applied to foreign brokers sell-
ing securities in the United States via the mails).
18. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
19. Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970), provides in pertinent
part:
78dd. Foreign securities exchanges.
(b) The provisions of this chapter . .. shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless
he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
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the court determined that the Act was not intended to apply extra-
territorially-at least not without substantial conduct occurring
within the United States. Nevertheless, fearing ease of avoidance of
the securities laws, courts in recent cases have adopted a more re-
strictive interpretation of the section 30(b) exclusion. In
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,0 the Second Circuit focused on the
"business in securities" requirement, holding the section 30(b) ex-
clusion to be inapplicable to an isolated sale of securities. The Ninth
Circuit was even more restrictive in SEC v. United Financial Group,
Inc.,2 construing "without the jurisdiction of the United States" as
referring not to territorial limits, but to the sphere of legitimate
American interests. Having thus limited the ability of section 30(b)
to remove international securities transactions from the reach of
American securities laws, the courts moved to determine subject
matter jurisdiction in light of foreign relations policy" and the
investor protection purposes underlying the securities acts., One
line of cases has followed the objective territorial approach enunci-
ated by Justice Holmes in Strassheim v. Daily,4 that a state has the
20. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on the merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub noma., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). There is, however, a
dispute among commentators as to the proper interpretation of Schoenbaum. Compare Com-
ment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1390-91 (1973) (section
30(b) was inapplicable in Schoenbaum because the transaction was an isolated sale-not a
business in securities) with Note, The International Character of Securities Credit: A Regula-
tory Problem, 2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 147, 159-60 (1970)(Schoenbaum departed from the
territorial interpretation of "within the jurisdiction of the United States"). It also is interest-
ing to note, that the lower court in the instant action adopted the latter interpretation of
Schoenbaum when faced with the section 30(b) defense raised by one of the defendants.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
21. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
22. See, e.g., Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. T 93,011 at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. (2d Cir. 1971)
(unreported):
If there is no such domestic impact from a substantially foreign transaction, United
States courts have no reason to become involved, and compelling reason not to become
involved, in the burdens of enforcement and the delicate problems of foreign relations
and international economic policy that extraterritorial application may entail.
(Emphasis in original).
23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., May 4, 1933.
24. 221 U.S. 280 (1911)(the case dealt with the extradition to Michigan of an Illinois
citizen who was charged with bribery of a Michigan public officer and with obtaining money
from the State of Michigan under false pretenses). Justice Holmes stated:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been
present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.
Id. at 285.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge
Learned Hand relied upon the Strassheim doctrine to extend the provisions of the Sherman
Act to encompass international activities.
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power to exert jurisdiction over conduct that occurs outside its terri-
tory but that causes a substantial effect within its territory., Under
this principle, the Second Circuit readily found subject matter juris-
diction in Schoenbaum6 on the strength of the fact that the securi-
ties at issue were listed on a domestic exchange, and that the activi-
ties had an adverse effect on the American securities market. Subse-
quent cases27 de-emphasized the importance of a domestic exchange
listing, but in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell,2 1 the Second Circuit held that adverse market effects
alone would not invoke subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the
Leasco court adopted a subjective territorial approach requiring a
combination of adverse effects and significant activity within the
United States to justify application of American securities laws to
international securities transactions. 9 Subsequently, Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd." established the de minimis amount of activ-
ity within the United States upon which subject matter jurisdiction
might be based. Both Leasco and Travis, however, emphasized that
the adverse effect involved fell upon resident American investors.
Indeed, even though the actual purchaser defrauded in Leasco was
a Netherlands Antilles corporation, the court, in finding jurisdic-
tion, perceived the real party affected to be its American parent
corporation. The court suggested that a contrary result would have
obtained had all parties been foreign.3 ' Nevertheless, in IT v. Ven-
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)(ii)
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (2d)] ably expresses the principle:
§ 18. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within Territory.
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if. . . (b)...
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial ....
26. 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. E.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g and
remanding 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Max-
well, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
28. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
29. RESTATEMENT (2d) § 17(a), expresses the principle:
§ 17. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest
within Territory. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such conse-
quences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory....
30. 474 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g and remanding 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo.
1971)(extensive use of United States mails and other facilities of interstate commerce held
sufficient to justify application of American securities laws).
31. The court stated:
The case is quite different from another hypothetical. . . where a German and a Japa-
nese businessman met in New York for convenience, and the latter fraudulently induced
the former to make purchases of Japanese securities on the Tokyo Exchange.
468 F.2d at 1338.
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cap, Ltd.,3 involving the purchase of foreign securities by an inter-
national investment trust, the Second Circuit upheld subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over substantially foreign parties when a fraudulent
investment scheme was perpetrated from the United States. More-
over, stressing that the fraud was practiced upon the international
trust itself, and not upon the individual investors, the court refused
to recognize as significant the adverse consequences t6 the small
number of American shareholders involved.3e It was, then, the for-
eign investor that IT sought to protect.3 4 Yet, the court failed to
define adequately what, if any, limits governed the availability of
American securities laws to foreign investors defrauded in interna-
tional transactions.
II. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court recognized at the outset that the proper ex-
traterritorial application of the securities laws was not to be found
in the language of the acts. 5 Neither did the court consider the
SEC's disclaimer of the applicability of registration requirements to
be controlling." Rather, the court looked to case law37 and foreign
relations policy38 in determining subject matter jurisdiction. The
court analyzed, one at a time, the jurisdictional bases relied upon
by the lower court.3 9 Considering first the defendants' activities
within the United States, the court noted its holding in IT v. Ven-
cap, Ltd., that the United States was not to be a breeding ground
for fraud." The court nonetheless concluded that jurisdiction would
not attach on the basis of activities that were merely preparatory
and insignificant in the overall scheme.' The court next addressed
the general adverse effects on the American securities market which
32. HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)(decided the same day as Bersch).
33. Approximately 300 American investors, owning about .5% of ]IT, were involved. Id.
at 1016.
34. The court stated:
We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only
to foreigners.
Id. at 1017.
35. See notes 5, 6, 16 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 17 supra.
37. The court noted, however, that the two major cases in the area, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), and Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), were not controlling.
38. See Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. (2d Cir. 1971).
39. See notes 1, 2, 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
40. 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975).
41. See note 7 supra.
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flowed from the alleged fraud.42 The court acknowledged the prece-
dent of Strassheim v. Daily,4" but reasoned that the only adverse
effects sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction were losses to
American purchasers of securities-purchasers in whom the United
States has an interest-not mere adverse effects to the general eco-
nomic interests of this country. Thus the court distinguished, on the
basis of nationality and residence, three groups of purchasers in the
instant class.4 Addressing the sales of foreign securities to Ameri-
cans resident in the United States, the court found subject matter
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the adverse effects to those inves-
tors.45 Secondly, construing the sales to Americans resident abroad,
the court stated that mere participation by such Americans will not
of itself invoke subject matter jurisdiction. When such sales were
viewed in conjunction with the preparatory acts occurring in this
country,4" however, the court held the United States' interest suffi-
cient to justify application of the securities laws. Finally, as to the
foreigners purchasing outside the United States, the court held that
mere preparatory acts within its boundaries did not give the United
States a sufficient interest to subject such sales to its securities laws.
Subject matter jurisdiction would arise in this last situation only
when acts performed in the United States directly caused the al-
leged fraud.
IV. COMMENT
Articulating a definitive standard for extraterritorial applica-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions of the American securities laws, the
instant decision resolves much of the confusion incident to the
transnational purchase and sale of securities. The Second Circuit
establishes an inverse relation between the purchaser's nexus with
the United States and the extent of activity occurring within this
country-the two traditional bases of subject matter jurisdic-
tion-and forges new law at both ends of the spectrum. Essentially,
the court recognizes that, the greater the purchaser's nexus with the
United States, the lesser the activity within the United States that
must be shown to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. Conversely, as
the purchaser's nexus with this country weakens, the extent of ac-
tivity within the United States must be considerably greater to
42. See note 9 supra.
43. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
44. See note 1 supra.
45. The losses sustained from the purchase of the I.O.S. securities were the adverse
effects recognized by the court.
46. See note 7 supra.
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bring the action within the United States' securities laws.
Decided the same day as IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,4" the instant
decision is of major import first for its limiting effect on the applica-
tion of the securities acts to substantially foreign investors. IT in-
volved a blatantly fraudulent scheme perpetrated from the United
States and, to discourage such activities, the court felt compelled
to allow foreign purchasers relief under the provisions of the Ameri-
can securities laws. Yet, basing jurisdiction on domestic activities
alone, the Second Circuit feared establishing too liberal a precedent
for foreign access to the securities acts. Thus Bersch presents the
vehicle to limit unequivocally foreign access to situations in which
the fraud actually emanates from the United States. Further, from
a policy standpoint, declining subject matter jurisdiction when con-
tacts with the United States are minimal appears to be a sound
decision. Extraterritorial application of the securities laws raises
serious questions of the binding effect of American judgments on
foreign parties,4" and portends an adverse effect on already crowded
federal dockets." As Bersch suggests, extraterritorial application of
the securities laws to transactions between foreign parties should be
but an extreme alternative.
Yet of potentially greater significance is the effect of the Bersch
decision on American purchasers of foreign securities. Citing injury
to American investors as the only type of consequence in the United
States that will justify subject matter jurisdiction, the Bersch court
expressly defines what Schoenbaum5" and Leasco1 only hinted at in
their "domestic exchange listing" and "real party affected" require-
ments. Unlike Schoenbaum and Leasco, in which the standard of
subject matter jurisdiction was inescapably tied to the factual set-
ting involved, the Bersch decision speaks in terms beyond the in-
stant facts and establishes a rule of broad application. Moreover,
when resident American investors are involved, the Bersch court
seems to go well beyond the bounds of prior decisions. Leasco, al-
though recognizing a substantial detrimental effect to American
shareholders of the corporation involved, expressly required signifi-
47. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); see notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
48. The record before the court contained uncontradicted affidavits that England, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France would not recognize an Ameri-
can judgment in favor of the defendant as a bar to an action by their own citizens, even
assuming that the citizens had in fact received notice that they would be bound unless they
affirmatively opted out of the plaintiff class.
49. Indeed, a class action may stand on special ground because of, as Judge Friendly
notes in 1IT, "the likelihood that a very small tail may be wagging an elephant." HT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 n.31 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968); see text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra.
51. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
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cant conduct within the United States to justify subject matter
jurisdiction. 52 Even Travis, which liberalized the measure of domes-
tic conduct necessary to support jurisdiction, was loath to disregard
the requirement entirely. 3 Nevertheless, construing similiar adverse
effects on resident American investors, the court in Bersch holds
that such adverse consequences alone are sufficient to support juris-
diction. The court's conclusion appears reasonable when one consid-
ers that the primary purpose of the securities acts was to protect the
domestic investor,54 but the precedential value of Bersch is unclear.
Courts generally have proved reluctant to extend jurisdiction be-
yond its fundamentally territorial nature,55 and with regard to this
one aspect-sales to resident American investors-the Bersch deci-
sion appears to go further than necessary. Indeed, a critical exami-
nation of the facts could discern activities within the United States
with respect to all three offerings" and, although Judge Friendly's
new standard is clear, the question remains whether future courts
will follow an overly broad, even though explicit, holding. Neverthe-
less, balancing the intent of the securities acts with the delicate
nature of foreign relations policy, the result in Bersch appears
sound. And, although it does not completely resolve the vagueness
in the area, the Second Circuit's definitive statement of the law in
each of three major classes of foreign securities transactions is a
commendable effort.
RICHARD MICHAEL PITT
52. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
53. 474 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
54. See note 23 supra.
55. See note 22 supra.
56. See notes 7, 11 supra.
57. The Bersch court avoids addressing the applicability of the section 30(b) foreign
seller exclusion, raised by one defendant, dismissing the complaint against that defendant
for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Such avoidance is unfortunate, however, in light of the
fact that the lower court rejected the section 30(b) defense, citing Schoenbaum for the propo-
sition that "without the jurisdiction of the United States" does not refer to territorial bounda-
ries-rather to the sphere of American interests. See note 20 supra. Schoenbaum does not
appear to espouse such a view and, if section 30(b) is not a dead letter, it is odd that Bersch
declines the opportunity to establish the proper scope of the exclusion.
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